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CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION 
A . Bac kground 
Agricultural cooperatives are substantial contributors in 
the marketing of agricultural products and farm input supplies 
and services. In 1990, cooperatives' combined market share of 
agriproducts marketed was twenty-seven percent. Cooperatives 
also claimed a twenty - seven percent share of the market for 
agricultural production supplies in the same year. The 
product's market share was down approximately six percent from 
1981 due in part to the failure of a few large regio nal 
cooperatives, e.g. Union Equity and Pacific Grain Growers. At 
the local level though, cooperatives generally realized gains 
in market share, especially in the production supplies 
business , up seven percent since 1981 (Kraenzle, 1992). 
Over this decade , the number of operating farmer -owned 
cooperatives and their memberships decreased dramatically. In 
1981, there were 6,211 cooperatives operating throughout the 
United States boasting memberships of 5 . 34 million. At the 
end of 1990 these numbers had dropped to 4,663 operating 
cooperatives with 4 . 12 million memberships (Kraenzle, 1992) 
Two contributing events in these declines were: 1) The 
combined effects of substantial decreases in the number of 
active farmers and increases in the size of farm operations 
forced many local cooperatives into merger or consolidations; 
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and, 2) the financial difficulties experienced in the 
agricultural industry during the 1980's led to an increase in 
acquisitions and liquidations of cooperatives. A result of 
this restructuring was that by 1990, a representative local 
marketing and supply cooperative's business volume and scope 
of operations had increased considerably. 
Reinforced by the organizational restructuring of the 
1980's the renewed interest in cooperative structure, theory 
and practices that began during the 1970's continues to 
attract the attention of industry leaders, researchers, 
theoreticians and policy makers. Much of the industry's 
interest naturally focuses on the issues that affect a 
cooperative's profitability and long-term viability . Academic 
attention has focused on the development and application of 
cooperative theory and its industrial organization 
implications, the research methodology used in measuring 
cooperative performance and public policy concerns of 
producers and consumers in the agribusiness arena. One of the 
objective of this thesis is measuring cooperative performance. 
The literature contains numerous studies comparing the 
performance and behavior of farmer-owned cooperatives to the 
performance and behavior of investor-oriented firms (I OFs ) . 
Past legislative mandates granted to cooperatives resulted in 
fundamentally different organization structures between them 
and IOFs. The enactment of the Capper-Volsted Act granted 
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farmer-owned cooperatives limited exemptions from anti-trust 
legislation. And subsequent Tax Acts provided favorable tax 
treatment to corporations operating on a cooperative basis, 
i . e dist ribut ing net earnings based on patronage rather than 
capital contribution. Agricul tural cooperatives have 
therefore occupied a unique position in the American economy 
as a pro ducer vehicle for vertical integration. 
This unique position of farmer -owned cooperatives in the 
economy has led some theorists , investigating the 
organizational differences between agricultural cooperatives 
and I OFs, to hypothesize a particular objective function for 
cooperatives and then show how attempts to max imize that 
function lead to behavior diffe rent from that of IOFs (Levay, 
Vansi c kle and Ladd et al.). Other researc hers have taken a 
more structural ist approach to identify how cooperatives and 
IOFs differ . This view argues that the unique structural 
c haracteristics of cooperatives may lead them to behave 
differently from IOFs (Staatz, 1987 ) . 
With the growth in the si z e and scope o f operations of 
cooperatives in the past decades, especially at the reg i onal 
level , some authors have argued that the behavior o f many 
farmer cooperat i ves has become indistingu ishab le from that o f 
I OFs (Kravi tz, 1974 ). This alleged blurring of function and 
purpose between these two organizational forms may have 
serious public policy implications regarding the specialized 
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tax treatment granted to cooperatives. The unique owner -
patron relationship that grants cooperatives differential tax 
liability has recently been challenged more seriously by tax-
reform propo nents. 
This challenge is forcing a maj or reexamination of income 
distribution methods, capital financing plans and the 
profitabi lity goals of cooperative forms o f business 
enterprise. In additio n to measuring cooperative performance, 
this thesis also examines the capital structure relationship 
between firm profitability and organizational growth. 
The remainder of this chapter reviews different capital 
financing characteristics and practices of both IOFs and 
agricultural cooperatives. Special attention is devoted to 
(1 ) methods of cooperative capital financing, (2 ) issues and 
concerns o f equity building, and (3) the Board o f Directors 
role as they establish and implement capital financ ing 
strategies. The chapter concludes with a problem statement 
defining a Board of Director's capital financing objectives 
and an outline of the research objectives of this thesis . 
B . Capital Financing in Investor-Oriented Firms 
The purpose of this section is to review and highlight 
the chief capital financing characteristics and practices of 
investor-oriented firms. It is not intended to be an 
exhaustive summary of financing issues faced by IOFs nor an 
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attempt to analyze their optimal capital structure . Rather it 
is aimed at providing the background necessary to compare and 
contrast the structural differences in capital financing 
between IOFs and locally owned farmer cooperatives. 
Investor-oriented firms have numerous sources of funds 
available to them when considering the capital requirements of 
financing new or existing investments. These sources may 
fulfill either the equity capital or debt capital needs of the 
firm . The instrumental sources of finance capital for an IOF 
includes the following: 1 ) A firm may offer new issues of 
common or preferred stock; 2 ) It may utili ze internally 
generated funds in the form of retained earnings; 3) It may 
acquire more debt in the form of bond issues; and 4) The firm 
may borrow funds from lenders, i.e. bank notes, mortgages, 
commercial paper, etc . 
Stock issues and retained earnings provide the equity 
base for an IOF. Retained earnings function as additional 
capital investments by the shareholders since share values are 
recapitalized in the secondary market, in part, based on a 
firm's ability to generate internal financing. The 
shareholders of an IOF's common stock are the owners of the 
corporation although their control of the firm is generally 
limited to the right to vote, either in person or by proxy, on 
Board of Director appointments or the issue of additional 
shares of common stock {Brealey and Myers, 1988 ) . The voting 
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rule is one vote per share owned so that an investor's control 
is proportionately based on the number of shares of stock, or 
equity, they hold of the firm . 
Common stock represents the permanent equity capital of 
an IOF. Owning common stock entitles the stockholder perpetual 
residual claims on the firms earnings. A stockholder's return 
on their investment has two sources: 1) dividends paid 
proportionately to the number of shares owned; and 2) any 
appreciation or depreciation in the value of the stock, 
including stock splits . The source of dividends paid to 
stockholders are the after-tax earnings of the firm. The 
value or price of common stock is continuously capitalized in 
the seco ndary market based on the market's expectations of a 
firm's future income streams. In addition to capitalizing 
stock values, the secondary market provides stockholders a 
source of liquidity on their investment. 
Retaining earnings is the simples t and most commonly 
practiced form of equity capital financing employed by IOFs . 
Because a firm may choose to reserve a percentage of its 
earn ings rather than paying them out as dividends, retained 
earnings serve as additional equity investments by the 
stockholders . The equity base may also be expanded and 
finance capital acquired from offering new issues of common 
stock , although this practice is seldom used . 
Retained earnings and dividends payments are derived from 
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a firm's after-tax profits. Dividends are subject to double 
taxation: as part of the earnings at the corporate level and 
then as dividend income at the individual level. IOFs, 
therefore, must examine any tax advantages or disadvantages 
when considering these two forms of capital financing . 
An essential source of capital financing available to an 
IOF is the corporate bond market. The bond market provides a 
firm a place to sell its corporate bonds to raise debt 
capital. Corporate bonds (funded ) represent long-term loans 
that investors provide to an IOF in return for regular 
interest payments until the bond matures or is called and its 
principle repaid. An IOF's liability is limited with respect 
to these debt issues in that stockholders have the right to 
default o n any debt obligation, handing over the corporation's 
assets to the lenders with no further recourse against 
stockholders (Brealey and Myers, 1988) . 
Mortgages, bank loans and commercial paper offer IOFs 
additional sources of debt-capital financing. The time 
horizon of these debt instruments varies . Mortgages are 
generally viewed as long-term debt while bank loans are 
considered intermediate debt and commercial paper is regarded 
as short-term debt. The choice and use of these sources of 
debt capital varies with the size of the firm, its immediate 
needs, and its long-term plans. The capital requirements of 
financing inventories or expanding a physical plant demand 
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appropriate use of debt instruments for such activities. 
must carefully weigh the capital costs of financing its 
ongoing needs and planned operations. 
IOFs 
Unlike dividends paid out of earnings or any retained 
earn ings, the interest IOFs pay on bonds and loans is from the 
firm's earnings before taxes. Interest payments are expens e 
before a firm's tax liability is calculated. This effectively 
creates a tax-subsidy when the capital financing of an IOF is 
acqui red through debt . 
Issuing preferred stock is another source of capital 
financing available to an IOF . Preferred stock is legally 
considered an equity security but unlike common stock, it 
u sually carries no voting rights a n d any dividends paid are 
made at the discretion of the Board of Directors. Preferred 
stock shares the same perpetual nature of common stock 
although a perce ntage of the issues make some provision for 
periodic retirement and in many cases corporations have an 
option to repurchase or call preferred stock at a specified 
price. Any dividends paid on preferred stock is from the 
after-tax earnings of the firm. 
Having reviewed the key capital financing alternatives 
a v ai l able to IOFs, the next section of this thesis examines 
capital financing of agricultural cooperatives and how it 
differs from that of an investor-oriented firm. 
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C. Capital Financing in Agricultural Cooperatives 
Before examining the capital financing practices of 
agricultural cooperatives and how they differ from those of 
IOFs, it is useful to review the unique organization structure 
and characteristics of farmer-owned cooperatives . This brief 
review provides the necessary foundatio n for understanding 
their specialized capital financing practices. 
Agricultural cooperatives are generally defined as 
business organizations that are owned and controlled by their 
patrons, who share in the economic benefits of the business 
based on member patronage. Given the diversity of these 
organizations, no one definition or theory of cooperatives is 
likely to be comprehens ive . 
Fo r the purposes of this thesis, a farmer-owned 
cooperative will be defined as an organization with the 
following characteristics (Staatz, 1987 ) : 
l. The stockholders, who are farmers, are the major 
users of the firm's services. 
2. The benefits a stockholder receives fro m committing 
capital to a cooperative are tied largely to 
patronage. There are three reasons for this : 
(a) The business pays a strictly limited dividend 
on equity capital invested in the organization . 
(b) Net margins are distributed among stockholders 
in proportion to their patronage with the 
business rather than in proportion to their 
equity ownership in the firm. This method of 
distributing margins captures the 
"business - at -cost" principle o f cooperative 
organization. 
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(c} Stock of cooperative firms does not ordinarily 
appreciate because there is a very limited or 
nonexistent secondary market for it. 
Therefore, capital gains are not a major 
benefit to stock ownership in cooperatives, in 
contrast to IOFs. 
3. The formal governance of the bus iness by the 
stockholders is structured "democratically" in the 
sense that: 
(a) Voting power is not proportional to equity 
investment. The limitation on "voting one's 
equity" may be in the form of a one-
member/one-vote rule, or voting may be 
proportional to patronage or stock ownership 
but subject to some limit such as restricting 
any one member from having more than 
five-percent of the total votes (It varies by 
state stature governing cooperative charters} . 
(b} There are strict limitations on the number of 
non-stockholders who may serve on the board of 
directors. 
With these operational definitions of farmer-owned 
cooperatives in mind, the unique features of cooperative 
capital financing can now be examined. 
1. Unique features of agricultural cooperative finance 
Two key characteristics that distinguish agricultural 
cooperatives from IOFs are: 1) methods of distributing net 
income ; and 2) sources for equity acquisition . Each of these 
characteristics are discussed in the following sections. 
Unlike their IOF counterparts, the earnings or net income 
of farmer-owned cooperatives is distributed to its 
owner-members based on their patronage level with the 
cooperative rather than on their investment or ownership o f 
11 
equity in it . The Board of Directors is granted the broad 
authority to decide how to distribute net income from the 
alternative distribution methods available. The alternative 
methods discussed in the following paragraphs include cash and 
noncash patronage refunds, qualified and nonqualified 
patronage refunds, dividends, and unallocated reserves. 
Patronage refunds are distributions of net income 
generated solely from patron business that are returned to 
patrons in proportion to the value or quantity of their 
patronage. These allocations may be determined on the basis 
of a straight percentage of the cooperative' s patronage or in 
the case of a 'pooling' cooperative, may be segregated by 
product line. They may be distributed in cash, retained by 
the cooperative as noncash refunds, or both. Additionally, 
patronage refunds may be in either qualified or nonqualif ied 
forms (Cobia, 1989). 
An important distinguishing feature of qualified 
patronage refunds is that they can be excluded from a 
cooperative's taxable income, under what is known as the 
"single tax principle". However, the patron must agree to 
include the entire refund as income when computing his or her 
own taxes. Cooperatives can make patronage refunds in cash 
payments, or they can pay part in cash and retain the noncash 
part in the cooperative to increase the patron's equity 
investment in the firm. In either event, the distribution is 
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classified as an allocated patronage refund. 
For a patronage refund to be qualified and thus exempted 
from the cooperative's taxable income, the refund must meet 
the following exacting criteria specified by the Internal 
Revenue Code: 1) A minimum of twenty- percent of the refund 
must be paid t o patrons in cash; 2) All of the cooperative's 
net income must have resulted from patronage-source business, 
not business done with non-members; 3) A preexisting 
obligation by the cooperative to pay the patronage refund must 
be made; and 4 ) Notification of the refund and cash payment 
must be made within specified time limits. If any of these 
four criteria are not met, the refund is classified as 
nonqualified and the cooperative is then obligated to pay 
taxes on it (Cobia p. 231, 1989 ) . 
Allocating a high percentage of refunds in cash form 
benefits current patrons and may encourage patronage and 
increase membership, because they can reduce cash flow 
problems of members who may be financially strapped. Cash 
patronage refunds are a positive incentive. However, a 
contention against high cash refunds is that they may 
compromise a cooperative's financial strength thus hindering 
its ability to grow . It is generally agreed that cooperatives 
should be capitalized in rough proportion to use by each 
member. High cash refunds tend to delay the accumulation of 
equity from under-invested members while delaying equity 
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redemption for over-invested members 
The noncash portion of qualified refunds or all of any 
nonqualif ied refunds are considered as retained refunds by the 
cooperative. Retained refunds are allocations of net income 
made to patrons but temporarily retained by the cooperative as 
allocated equity. The purpose of retaining refunds, rather 
than returning them to patrons in cash, is to increase patron 
equity in the cooperative. Patrons are informed of this 
action by written notices of allocation . Allocated retains 
are the major source of equity capital in midwestern grain 
cooperatives . These accumulated funds are used for expansion 
or to replace previously contributed equity that is scheduled 
for redemption. 
Nonqualif ied patronage refunds are allocations of net 
income that do not fulfill the qualifying criteria set by the 
IRS and for which the cooperative must temporarily assume the 
income-tax liability. Members are not required to report 
these refunds as part of their taxable income until they are 
redeemed as cash. Under the "single tax principle" the 
cooperative is entitled to deduct the amount redeemed from its 
taxable income upon the member's redemption of the refund. 
Written notices of allocation are required for nonqualif ied 
refunds. Although not widely used, cooperatives may utilize 
this form of refund to minimize the tax liability of its 
members from issuing qualified cash refunds, at least until 
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the nonqualified is redeemed as cash. 
Dividend payments by cooperatives are treated and 
distributed quite differently than those paid by IOFs. Unlike 
the permanent nature of equity capital in an IOF, cooperat ive 
equity is rarely considered permanent. It must be redeemed at 
a future date and does not entitle the owner perpetual claims 
on the firm's earnings unless the stockholder continues to 
patronize the cooperative. Then the claim on earnings is 
proportional to the amount of patronage done and not on the 
amount of stock owned. Thus equity ownership in an 
agricultural cooperative represents a temporary investment 
that entitles its owner to claims on the firm's earnings over 
the duration of their patronage. And unlike IOFs, cooperative 
equity capital is rarely exchanged or traded among members or 
nonmembers. The equity of a cooperative essentially 
represents a commitment by its owner to support and patronize 
the business. 
Some cooperatives do distribute part of their net income 
to equity holders based on proportion of equity held rather 
than on patronage. In this respect, the income distribution 
mimics the dividend payments of IOFs to their stockholders and 
is not eligible for single tax treatment. However, by law, 
cooperatives are limited to the amount of dividends payable on 
equity capital, to eight percent or less of the equities ' face 
value. And normally they are paid only on membership stock . 
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Equity dividend payments by cooperatives account for a very 
small portion of net income distributions . The use of 
dividends by cooperatives is chiefly limited to only section 
521 cooperatives, where the cooperative is allowed to deduct 
dividend payments from their taxable income . 1 These Section 
521 organizations make up a small fraction of the cooperatives 
operating today in the grain business. 
Cooperatives may distribute part of their net income as 
unallocated equity or reserves. Unallocated reserves are 
earnings retained by the cooperative but not allocated to 
member-patrons . These reserves may be from patronage or non-
patronage source income. Unallocated reserves are discussed 
in more detail it the following section . 
2. Equity and debt issues in cooperative financing 
Agricultural cooperatives face many of the same questions 
and problems that investor-oriented firms must consider when 
determining their capital financing structure. How does the 
capital structure of the firm affect its profitability? Can 
additional leverage improve the performance of the firm assets 
without threatening solvency? What combination of debt and 
equity provides the optimal capital structure mix? All firms 
must address these as well as other questions when considering 
1 Under subchapter T of the Internal Revenue Code, only a 
section 521 cooperative can deduct from taxable income 
nonpatronage income distributed to patrons on a patronage basis 
and dividends on c apital stock. 
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their capital financing strategies. 
What differentiates IOFs and cooperatives with regards to 
capital financing is how they acquire and handle equi ty. The 
unique user-owner linkage of cooperatives makes it both 
possible and necessary for a cooperative to secure and handle 
owner-equity capital with specialized methods. Equity 
acquisition by cooperatives is the focus of this section. But 
first, the unique features of cooperative equity are 
summarized by the following five points (Cobia and Brewer, 
1989) : 
1) Only qualifying persons, generally agricultural 
producers, can become members and own common stock 
or obtain membership certificates in a Capper -
Vostead agricultural cooperative . 
2) Patrons provide equity in anticipation of benefits 
arising from patronage rather than in expectation of 
capital appreciation or dividends. 
3) Equity is redeemed by the cooperative at book or par 
value, whichever is less. 
4) Cooperatives often raise equity indirectly through 
the use of retained patronage refunds or per-unit 
capital retains. 
5) A substantial portion of cooperative equity is 
temporary because cooperatives have an implied 
obligat ion to redeem it, although mandatory 
obligations f or redemption do not currently exist . 2 
Because equity investment incentives in cooperatives, as 
opposed to IOFs, lie in the perceived benefits of its 
2 Some states do have provisions that approach mandatory 
redemption. For example, Iowa law requires that cooperat ives 
settle its estate claims before revolving any equity or issuing 
more than t wenty-percent of its patronage refunds in cash. 
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owner-members, agricultural cooperatives have limited sources 
from which they can attract their risk capital . Cooperatives 
are further limited because potential contributors frequently 
find it difficult to obtain funds for such investments . There 
are three types and sources of allocated equity available to 
cooperatives for building a pool of member equity: 1 ) direct 
investments; 2) retained patronage refunds; and 3) per-unit 
capital retains . Cooperatives may also accumulate risk 
capital from unallocated equity or reserves, though these 
sources account f or a relatively small percentage of grain 
marketing coopera tive's equity. 
Direct investments include cash purchases of common or 
p r eferred stock, membership ce r tificates, and other forms of 
equity. Normally the start-up capital of a cooperative is 
acquired this way, directly from its founding member-patrons . 
Existing cooperatives may also use the direct investment 
method to accumulate equity from its members, although the 
amounts raised are usually limited and it is of ten a difficult 
and unsuccessful method of accumulating capita l . 
As previously mentioned, retained patronage refunds are 
portions of net income allocated to members but retained by 
the cooperative . They represent new investments made in the 
cooperative by those who are patronizing it . Retaining 
patronage refunds is a popular practice because once 
e stablished it is an easy and systematic method of generating 
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equity funds. This method of equity building is particularly 
well suited for supply-service and buy-sell marketing 
cooperatives, where per-unit capital retains do not work well. 
Depending on retained patronage refunds as a major source 
of equity capital may be problematic in that the quantity of 
retained refunds is dependent on net income. And since net 
income fluctuates with the fortunes of a cooperative, yearly 
retains do not necessarily match past year retains thus 
creating a matching problem between ownership and patronage as 
equity is revolved. 
Per-unit capital retains are patron investments in the 
cooperative that are based on the value or number of unit s of 
the products handled for each patron. These investments are 
deducted from the proceeds of the product a patron markets 
through the cooperative. Marketing cooperatives most 
frequently employ this method of accumulating equity capital . 
Per-unit capital retains are allocated to patrons in either 
qualified or nonqualified form. They provide a more stable 
source of equity accumulation than does retained refunds since 
they are not affected by the level of net income of the 
cooperative. However, a drawback of this method of equity 
building is that cash that would otherwise be available to the 
farmer is reduced by the amount of the retain. 
Equity capital may also be accumulated by building funds 
that are not allocated to any member, patron, or other 
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individual account by any fo rm o f c ert ific ate o r book credit. 
Instead , this equity shows up as member equity on the balance 
sheet but in an unalloc ated account. These unallocated 
equities or reserves have numerous s ources but a substantial 
percentage of them come from non- member business. States 
often place an upper limit on the amount of non-member 
business a cooperative may conduct . Al so, some states legally 
obligate their cooperatives to maintain a specified level of 
unallocated equities while other states permit unlimited 
unallocated reserves f o r purposes of c overing possible loss es. 
Creditors may look favorably upon cooperatives with 
significant levels of unallocated reserves. They view these 
reserves as securable collateral for loan purposes. Ho wever , 
these unallocated equities may create some problems as a 
method of c apital building. Not allocating net income derived 
from member business violates the cooperative's principle of 
bus iness at cost. And it may reduce member's incentives for 
additional investment while simultaneously increas ing 
incentives to dissolve the cooperative. 
3. Board of Directors role in cooperative financing 
The make-up and functio n of the Board of Directors in an 
agricultural cooperative vari es substantially from that o f an 
investor-oriented firm. Whereas an I OF's Board of Directors 
serve as a trustee of the owner's investments , the Board of a 
cooperative serves not only as a trustee but also as a 
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representative for its owner-patrons. Most cooperative's 
articles of incorporation and bylaws have str ict limits on 
non-stockholders serving as Directors on the Board . 
A cooperative's Board plays a much more active role in 
the decision-making process of the bus iness , especially 
regarding pricing policy, managerial monitoring, and in the 
acquisition of equity and debt capital in financing the 
cooperative's assets. The remainder of this section is 
devoted to the issues and concerns a cooperative's Board of 
Directors face when developing capital financing plans. 
Some theorist have hypothesized that the structure and 
role of the Board of Di r ectors in an agricultural cooperative 
are a function of the unique set of property rights embedded 
in cooperative enterprise {Condon, 1987) . Unlike an IOF where 
managerial performance is often reflected by the daily 
movements of the firm's stock price in the secondary market, 
there is no market that continually monitors and evaluates the 
performance of a cooperative ' s management in a similar 
fashion. The task of monitoring the management performance in 
a cooperative, especially in locals , rests with the Board of 
Directors . 
The Board o f most l ocal cooperatives is made up entirely 
of elected member-patrons whose primary experience is related 
to farm management. Often they have little experience in 
controlling the affairs of a large and more complex business 
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enterprise. This fact reinforces the need for the Directors 
to consider and understand the different capital financing 
trade-offs and options available to their cooperative . At 
least some Board understanding of this is necessary if the 
cooperative is to increase its profitability and ensure an 
adequate capital base for its continued operation. 
Maintaining an adequate capital base is essential to any 
organization's survival. This is especially true for 
agricultural cooperatives who have somewhat limited sources of 
equity capital . A chief responsibility of a cooperative's 
Board of Directors is maintaining its capital base and 
determining its structure. A cooperative 's debt-equity mix is 
a f undamental aspect of the continued profitability of the 
firm's assets. The Board of Directors must determine which 
levels of debt and equity capital can best serve that goal . 
However, cooperative capital structure financing does not 
take place in a vacuum. In addition to determining the debt-
equity capital mix that best optimize the cooperative's 
performance, the Board of Directors must also consider the 
concerns of its member-patrons . Capital financing decisions 
by the Board affects the profitability of the cooperative's 
individual members' enterprise as well as the cooperative 
itself. The effects on member operations extend beyond any 
direct financial impact. 
The long-term viability of the cooperative is also 
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important because the members in many local grain and input 
supply cooperatives depend on the service of a cooperative to 
support their continued farming operation . A Board of 
Director's myopia regarding capital financing may not be 
immediately apparent. Too often it manifests itself later in 
reduced earnings, a shaky capital base and even insolvency. 
The Board of Directors has three fundamental capital 
structure responsibilities: 1) to ensure the effective use of 
equity and debt capital; 2) to develop and maintain an 
adequate equity redemption plan; and 3) to maintain financial 
viability of the cooperative. The following section of this 
thesis' introduction formulates these concerns of the Board 
into a problem statement, followed by a statement of its 
research objective. This chapter ends with a brief outline of 
following chapters. 
D. Problem Statement and Research Objectives 
A cooperat ive's Board of Directors must ask itself many 
questions when formulating its capital financing plans. Does 
the cooperative have sufficient equity for its operations? 
Does it have too much? Is equity being used to cover up poor 
operating performance? What levels of debt are proper and 
feasible for financing asset investments ? How can the level 
of debt capital affect the cooperative's profitability? To 
what extent does the equity-asset structure affect the growth 
23 
of the business? These questions, along with others, form the 
core of the varied problems a cooperative's Board of Directors 
face in making capital financing decisions. Developing and 
implementing strategies and plans that address these questions 
and their resultant problems are a major function of t he 
Board. 
A problem statement regarding a cooperative's capital 
financing structure may be formulated in three parts : 
1. Does the cooperative's current capital structure 
facilitate or detract from its profitability and 
growth? 
2 . What changes, if any, in the cooperative's mix of 
debt and equity capital are necessary to improve its 
profitability? 
3 . Can a targeted capital structure simultaneously 
increase profitability, promote growth and permit 
timely equity retirement? 
When considering capital financing questions confronting 
the cooperative, the Board of Directors are explicitly 
determining opt imal financing methods while they are 
simultaneously attempting to maintain the owner-user 
principles of cooperative organization and serve farmers 
needs. These c an often be conflicting goals. 
Chapter II provides a literature review of business firm 
performance measures and studies. The chapter also reviews 
studies on cooperative financing and performance, then 
concludes with a description of the model used in this study. 
The objective of this study was to investigate the 
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relationships between local grain marketing and input supply 
cooperative's profitability, capital structure and growth 
potential. The study measured cooperatives' rates of return 
on their assets and equity and examines structural differences 
in the debt /equity mixes of a representative sample o f 
midwestern grain elevators. A model of cooperative 
profitability was used to classify firms according to their 
realized rates of return on assets and equity . The model 
identified firms with superior rates of return on owner's 
investment and an analysis was performed to determine the 
financial characteristics that distinguished these 
cooperat ives from their less successful counterparts. 
Chapter III follows with a discussion of the empirical 
procedure used in the study. Included is a description of the 
data and variables under investigation. In Chapter IV, the 
results of the study are analyzed. Financial variable and 
ratio profiles are discussed and profitability group 
comparisons are made. The summary and conclusions of the 
study are found in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL MODEL AND 
METHODOLOGY 
A. Firm Level Analysis of Financial Performance 
Numerous studies measuring firm financial performance 
have been conducted for both investor-oriented (corporate ) and 
cooperative organizations. Within the literature has been 
debat e whether the financial strength of farmer - owned 
cooperatives is comparable with standard measures of 
performance in similar industries (Royer, 1991). Questions 
have also arisen about whether the equity-based performance 
measures of agricultural cooperatives are similar to the 
measures used in IOFs (Pa rliament and Lerman , 1993) . These 
studies investigate significant differences in the standard 
performance measures between the two f orms o f business 
organization. 
Although researchers have hypothesized operational 
differences when measuring the financial performance of IOFs 
and cooperatives, the empirical measures and methods used to 
assess these firm's financial condition are simi lar . A 
discussion of these measures and methods of quantifying fi rm 
level financial performance follows. 
1. Financial performance measures 
Without exception, business managers must periodically 
have a financial analysis done for their firm to measure and 
26 
evaluate the efficiency of its assets use, the profitability 
of its owner's investment , and the ability to service its 
debt. Investors and creditors often employ financial analysts 
to conduct these evaluations. In evaluating a firm's 
financial condition and performance, analysts frequently use 
financial ratios to express the relationship between various 
values or categories in a firm's financial statements. 
Numerous financial ratios are available for analysts to 
assess the financial condition of a firm. However, because 
many of these ratios are highly correlated within a particular 
performance category (Chen and Shimerda, 1980 ) relatively few 
ratios are needed to measure the crucial aspects of a firm's 
performance. Ratios are typically classified according to 
four different economic aspects of the firm's operations (Frey 
and Behrens, 1981 ) . These four aspects are: 
a ) Profitability 
b ) Solvency 
c) Liquidity 
d ) Efficiency 
Because the research objective of this study was to 
investigate the relationship between the profitability and 
solvency effects on a cooperative's viability and growth, the 
following discussion is limited to the first two economic 
aspects in the context of local grain marketing and supply 
c ooperatives. 
27 
Profitability: Almost without exception, business firms 
are intended to be profitable by their owners . Profitability 
refers to the ability of a firm to generate income in excess 
of expenses. However, cooperatives are not specifically 
organized to earn profits in a manner similar to IOFs. 
Rather, they are required to charge prices equal to costs or 
refund any surplus of revenues over costs to members in 
proportion to patronage (Royer, 1992). This is achieved by 
allocating a cooperative's net operating income to its member-
patrons as cash refunds or equity credits. 
Two measures of firm profitability used in this study are 
return on investment (local equity) and return on assets 
(local assets). 
Return on investment is the ratio of a cooperative's net 
earnings to the equity investment of its owners. The ratio is 
widely used as a measure of performance for the firms's equity 
capital. It can be viewed as the dollar amount of profit 
returned to the firm' s owner for each dollar they have 
invested. This ratio is sensitive to the amount of debt 
capital the firm uses to finance its assets. 
The interest of this study is the performance of 
investments (local equity) under the direct control of a 
cooperative 's member-patrons. For this reason, the equity 
investments of a cooperative in non-local enterprises, i.e. 
regional affiliates, Bank of Cooperatives, and other locals 
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are excluded from a measure of return o n investment. These 
non-local investments are subsumed under investments in other 
cooperatives on a local's balance sheet. Local equity, 
therefore, is the difference between a cooperative's total 
equity and its investments in other cooperatives. 
Return on assets is the ratio of a cooperative's net 
earnings to the total assets employed by a firm. The ratio is 
a measure of the performance of a firm's assets without 
regards to how the assets are funded. The measure captures 
the rate of return on assets from debt and equity financing . 
It can be viewed as the dollar amount of profits earned per 
dollar of assets employed by the business. Because return on 
total assets incorporates both debt and equity capital in its 
measure, it does not demonstrate the leverage sensitivity 
found in return on equity and may be a more reflective measure 
of profitability. 
Again, the interest of this study was the performance of 
the total assets (local assets) under direct control o f a 
cooperative's member-patrons. A local cooperative's equity 
investments in 'other c ooperatives' are offset on the asset 
side of its balance sheet with an equivalent entry under other 
investments. The local assets used to measure a cooperative's 
rate of return on total assets were derived by subtracting its 
balance sheet entry f o r o ther investments from its t o tal 
assets. The rate of return measure of assets therefore 
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captures the return generated by a local's total current and 
fixed assets. 
Solvency: Solvency typically refers to the capital 
structure of a business. That is, to what degree are debt and 
equity c apital used to finance the firm's assets. Of 
particular interest is the relationship between the level of 
debt and equity capital used to finance the firms fixed 
a ssets. Solvency ratios give an indication of balance sheet 
strength and the relative claims the owners and debtors of a 
firm have on its assets (Ginder and Henningsen, 1993 ) . This 
study uses a total debt-local assets measure of solvency . 
The total debt-local asset ratio is a measure of the 
amount of debt used to finance a firm's loca l assets . The 
ratio can be viewed as the dollar amount of debt the firm 
carries for each dollar of locally owned assets it employs. 
Generally , higher measures of this ratio indicate increased 
levels of financial risk. Highly leveraged firms often 
e xperience difficulties in obtaining additional loans during 
periods of unfavorable economic conditions and may therefore 
face possible divestiture or even liquidation. 
2. Studies of financial performanc e measures 
Financial ratios have proved useful in evaluating the 
performance and financial condition of business organizations. 
Studies have shown that financial ratios can separate 
financially-distressed firms from non-failed firms with a high 
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degree o f accuracy in the year before t he declaration of 
bankruptcy (Altman, 1968 and Beaver, 1967) . Another study 
showed that the use of financial ratios to determine bond 
ratings resulted in virtually identical ratings with the 
bond's institutional ratings (Pinches and Mingo, 1973 ) . 
These studies demonstrated certain predictive powers 
associated with specific financial ratios . Yet there are 
dozens o f ratios financial analysts can use to measure the 
performance and financial condition of a firm . Surprisingly 
few empirical studies have examined the applicability of 
specific financi a l ratios in analyzing firms . 
A study by Pinches, Mingo and Caruthe rs (1973 ) 
established an e mpirically based classifica tion of financial 
ratios . Their analysis revealed seven classifications of 
ratios that can be represented by seven factors - Return on 
Investment, Financial Leverage, Capital Turnover, Short-term 
Liquidity, Cash Pos ition, Inventory Turnover and Receivables 
Turnover. Four of these factors parallel the four traditional 
classifications of ratios identified by Frey and Behrens. 
In the aforementioned study, representative ratios of 
profitability we r e cash flow to net worth, c a sh flow to total 
assets, and cash fl ow to sales. A ratio represen ting 
efficiency was s a les to assets, representing a liquidity ratio 
was current assets to current liabilities, and representing a 
s olvency ratio was debt to assets. 
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Solvency ratios have been further analyzed by researchers 
attempting to link debt levels with income. Melichar (1984 } 
illustrated the joint impact of a farmer's debt level and the 
interest rate to the income rate of return on equity . In 
identifying financially stressed operations, he classified 
farm firms by debt-asset ratio categories. 
Harrington (1985 ) divided and labeled these ratio 
classifications of farm operato rs into four groups . Farm 
operators with debt-asset ratios over one hundred percent were 
described as "technically insolvent". Operators having ratios 
between seventy and one hundred percent had "extreme financial 
problems" . Those operators having debt-asset ratios between 
forty and seventy percent had "serious financial problems " , 
and those with ratios below forty percent had "no apparent 
financial problems " . 
B. Studies of Performance in Agricultural Cooperatives 
The empirical studies reviewed in this section examine 
methods of measuring agricultural cooperative performance and 
techniques of comparing their performance with IOFs. 
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, many cooperatives 
were experiencing severe financial stress due to low rates of 
return and over-leveraging. Haugen (1981} found that 
cooperatives were increasingly relying on the use of long-debt 
in place of equity relative to competing agricultural firms 
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and that cooperative returns were below those of competitors. 
It was hypothesized that cooperatives had greater leverage 
ratios than the industry average because, in part, they were 
"equity bound", i.e. due to the lack of secondary markets for 
their stock, debt financing dominated internal financing for 
many firms (Royer, 1991) . The fundamental point was that a 
cooperative's members were its only source of equity capital. 
In 1991, Royer conducted a comparative, financial ratio 
analysis of farmer-owned cooperatives to determine (1) whether 
significant differences existed in the financial strength of 
cooperatives compared with industry standards, and (2) to 
assess whether cooperative's relative financial condition had 
generally improved since the early 1980's. 
The study focused on firm liquidity, measured by the 
current ratio, and firm solvency, measured by the debt/equity 
ratio. Because the source of the industry standards presented 
only median and quartile financial ratios, the analysis was 
based largely on the use of non-parametric statistical 
methods. 
The results of the analysis provided no evidence to 
support the hypothesis that cooperatives generally were 
financially weaker than other firms in the industries in which 
they operated. Current ratios lower than their industry 
standard were found in several cooperative groups, although 
most of these groups consisted of marketing associations. 
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This finding was largely explained by the unique business 
r elatio nship between these associations and their members and 
the extent in which proceeds payable to patrons appeared o n 
year end balan c e sheets as current liabilities. 
Comparative analysis o f cooperative debt / equity ratios 
indica ted that , with the e x ception of regi ona l grain and 
regional farm supply firms , cooperatives generally were less 
l everaged that other firms in their industries. This was 
especially true for local cooperatives handling grain and farm 
input supplies. A factor contributing to the differences 
between the regional and locals is tha t the equity position of 
local cooperatives handling grain and farm supplies is 
artificially enhanced by the double counting of the earnings 
they r eceive from their regional affiliates but which are 
retained by the regional as capital investments . At the end 
o f fiscal 1987 , nearly twenty- seven percent of local grain and 
farm supply cooperative's equity was held as inter-cooperative 
i nvestments. 
The single tax treatment granted to businesses operating 
on a cooperative basis has led t o criticism that these firms 
enjoy an unfair adv antage over their IOF counterparts in 
raising equity capital . The c ritics argued that retained 
patronage refund allocations represent a fre e, untaxed s ource 
o f equity capital that confers a cost of capital advantage t o 
cooperatives . 
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IOFs and cooperatives both have incentives in relying on 
internal financing for raising equity capital , but for 
different reasons . The double taxation of corporate income 
discourages ongoing corporations from issuing new shares of 
common stock. An IOF's incentive for internal financing stems 
largely from tax considerations. Cooperative incentives to 
rely on internal finance are partly tax-based but are more 
dependent on the property structure of the firm, i.e . the 
practice of member-patrons supporting and financing the firm's 
operations in proportion to their patronage. 
Caves and Petersen (1986) investigated the hypothesized 
11 tax advantage 11 of cooperat ives over IOFs with respect to 
their respective costs of capital and its effects on 
cooperative growth rates . The authors first examined taxation 
and the cost of internal finance among IOFs and cooperatives 
and then investigated the relationship between internal 
financing and firm growth. 
Citing an approach used in the literature of finance and 
public finance for determining debt's net tax advantage by way 
of internal finance, the authors assessed the possible tax 
advantage of cooperatives. They showed that tax savings can 
be achieved by the cooperative form of organization if 
(2 . 1) 
where I is a firm's pre-tax income , Td is personal tax rate on 
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dividends, Tc is the effective rate of corporation income tax, 
and T
9 
is the effective rate of personal tax on capital gains. 
The expression o n the left hand side of the inequality 
represents the after - tax income available to members of a 
cooperative regardless of whether income is retained or paid 
as dividends. The right hand expression represents the after-
tax income available to corporate investors if income is 
retained. 
Prior to the Tax Act of 1986, the authors noted that 
because the effective tax rate on capital gains was so low1 , 
cooperatives enjoyed a tax advantage on retentions if Ta < Tc , 
or slightly more, depending how close to zero T9 actually was. 
However, because of diverse perso nal tax rates (Ta ) , IOFs and 
cooperatives may actually face the same marginal cost of 
c apital. 2 The authors noted that "diverse personal tax rates 
combined with a different tax system is one reason 
cooperatives and corporations may coexis t in long-run 
equilibrium with their market shares depending on the 
distribution of farmer 's incomes'' (p.209 ) . 
The study next addressed the issue o f the potential 
growth rates of corporations and cooperatives. It f ocused on 
1 A substantial reason t he effective tax rate on capital 
gains is s o l ow is that capital gains are taxed at the time of 
reali zation rather than accrual. 
2 In addition to the marginal tax rate, cooperat ive 
members must pay FICA tax of 15% that IOF i nvestors avoid . 
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the differences in growth rates that arose because (1 ) IOFs 
are subject to the corporate income tax and (2) cooperatives 
retire retained earnings with some lag . A fixed debt-equity 
ratio was assumed for the analysis. Although debt is a 
significant source of finance, both corporations and 
cooperatives are thought to be constrained in its use by some 
maximum ratio. The analysis therefore investigated firm 
growth on the assumption that internal finance was the only 
binding constraint on the growth process. 
Supposing that a corporation and cooperative earn the 
same pre-tax rates of return its capital, r /( l - Tc ) , if the 
corporation 's income tax is Tc then its after-tax return is 
simply r . Assuming that the corporation retains R percent of 
its earnings, maintains its debt-equity ratio, and its capital 
stock does not depreciate, it will grow at a rate of Rr . A 
cooperative, under the same assumptions, would experience a 
growth rate of Rr/( l - Tc) if it did not have to retire any 
retentions and it fully allocated all its earnings . With an 
effective corporate tax rate of Tc= 0 .4, the authors state 
that a cooperative could initially acquire capital at a rate 
two-thirds faster than the corporation. 
Because the retained earnings are retired with some lag, 
the growth rate calculation for a cooperative becomes more 
complicated . What the authors show is that by varying the 
level of retentions and the lag period for its retirement, a 
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cooperative's growth path takes on various values. Newly 
formed cooperatives may experience rapid growth initially but 
this rate cannot be sustained once rotation begins. The same 
is true if a cooperative increases its retention rate. It 
will realize a spurt in growth that lasts until one rotation 
period is complete, then the growth rate will diminish. 
The result s of this study indicate that because of 
differential tax treatment, cooperatives can for a time grow 
faster than corporations employing the same retention rate . 
But, because of equity rotation the growth advantage could 
swing to corporations over the long run if cooperative' s 
capital cost exceed those of investor oriented firms . 
Therefore , even if cooperatives have a lower cost of capital 
advantage over IOFs, they may not be able to translate this 
advantage into a continuous expansion of their operations and 
market share. 
C. An Earnings Model of Financial Performance 
Ultimately, economic performance (profitability) is the 
source of returns to repay investors and lenders for the risks 
they assume. Earnings (as opposed to liquidating assets, 
refinancing, or borrowing more money) are the most desirable 
and reliable source of funds to make principal and interest 
payments. A stable trend of positive earnings is one of the 
best assurances that a firm will be able to borrow when funds 
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are needed, then eventually repay the debt (Barickman, 1985 ) 
"The relationship between net income and the c apital 
invested in the generation of that income is one of the most 
valid and most widely recognized measures of enterprise 
performance" (Bernstein p.102, 1983 ) . The broad category of 
return on investment (ROI ) relates income to the amount of 
capital needed t o generate that income. Bernstein considers 
ROI the most reliable indicator of long-term financial health, 
better than common balance sheet measures. 
Within the general category of ROI, the return on total 
assets is perhaps the best measure of operating performance of 
a business without regard to how the assets were financed. A 
simplified measure of the returns on assets can be calculated 
as follows: 
ROA = (NI + I ) I [ (BA + EA) /2) (2. 2 ) 
where ROA = return on assets, 
NI = net income, 
I interest expense, 
BA = beginning assets, 
EA = ending assets. 
Net income is equal to revenues less expenses. Interest 
is not included in expenses because ROA is a measure of 
earnings to reward both debt and equity capital. The average 
value of assets is used because the return earned in a given 
39 
period of time should be related to the assets that were 
available, on average, during that time period . With the 
year-to-year inventory fluctuations o f cooperatives and their 
non-uniform fiscal year ends, average assets seemed the best 
choice for measuring rates of return for the study. 
The return on owner's equity measures the returns 
accruing to the owner's investment after the interest payment 
on debt capital has been met. A simplified measure of return 
on equity is calculated as: 
ROE= NI /[( BE + EE) / 2] 
where ROE = return on equity, 
BE = beginning equity, 
EE = ending equity. 
( 2. 3) 
Average equity was used in the measure of return on 
owner's investment because the value of that investment can 
fluctuate depending on market conditions, firm performance, 
and within the context of a cooperative, the rate of equity 
that is retired in a fiscal year. 
Melichar (19 85 ) suggested examining farming operations 
based on their performance indicated by the relationship 
between profitability and capital structure. This can be done 
by examining the reciprocal relationship between the return on 
equity and the return on assets from the following identity : 
ROE ROA - ( i (l-t ) D/ A )/1 - D/ A ( 2 . 4 ) 
where i 
D/ A 
t 
4 0 
interest rate on debt , 
debt-asset ratio, 
tax rate. 
Return on equity is a function of the return on assets, 
the after tax interest rate, and the capital structure of the 
firm . Inversely, ROA is a weighted average of ROE and the 
after tax interest rate . The weights are the percent equity 
and the percent debt capital. 
This study applies Melichar's approach in examining 
agricultural cooperatives. However, due to the deductibility 
o f patronage payments prior to tax calculation by 
cooperatives , the return on equity is a function of the return 
o n assets, the interest rate, and capital structure of the 
firm. 
The differences between the rates of return on equity and 
assets isolates the effect borrowed capital has on the return 
to owner's equity . A model can be constructed that captures 
this relationship between the two measures of return . Figure 
2 .1 presents a graphical illustration of the model that plots 
a firm's rate of return measures in ROE and ROA span. 
In the model, a firm's return o n equity is graphed on the 
vertical axis and its return on assets is graphed on the 
horizontal axis. The forty - five degree line cutting the 
northeast quadrant of the graph represents identical measures 
o f ROE and ROA for a firm. It also represents a boundary over 
infeasible 
,' Gr o up IV 
ROE <- = ROA < 0 
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ROE 
Group I 
ROE ROA > 0 
Group 11 
ROA > ROE > 0 
Group Ill 
ROE < = 0 < ROA 
Figure 2.1 Model of Cooperative Profitability 
ROA 
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which the debt a firm holds can vary between acting as a 
positive or negative contribut i on towards its return on 
equity. 
The forty-five degree line bisecting the s outhwest 
qua drant represents a limit between the relationship of ROE 
and ROA. If both measures o f return are negative, then ROE 
must always be less than or equal to ROA. And, the only 
possibility of the measures being equal would be the case of a 
firm whose assets were funded solely with equity capital. 
Four pro fitability groups, based on a firms relative 
measures of ROE and ROA, are identified and labeled as Group 
I, II, III, o r IV. If ROE is greater than ROA and they are 
both positive (Group I firms ) , leverage has a positive 
contribution to the cooperative ' s returns to equity . If ROA 
is greater than ROE and they are bo th p o sitive (Group II 
firms) , leverage has no effect o r s ome adverse effects on the 
fi rm . When the firm's ROA is positive but ROE is negative or 
zero (Group III firms ) , leverage has enough of a negative 
i nfluenc e o n the firm to cause its ROE to fall to or below 
zero . Whe n ROA a nd ROE are both negative (Group IV firms ) 
l everage has such an adverse e ffect o n the firm that any debt 
it holds i s a fur t her financial imposition on the firm . 
This study calculates these re t u rn measures on the data 
sets for cooperatives identified in the following chapter. 
Firms are c lassified by the profitability groups previously 
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described and the effects of their debt structure are 
investigated to determine to what extent and degree firm 
performance and profitability are influenced by the level of 
debt a cooperative holds. 
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CHAPTER III. EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES 
A. The Data 
The data used in this study were financial statements of 
grain marketing and input supply cooperatives located in Iowa, 
Nebraska and South Dakota . A seven year time series for a 
cross-section of cooperatives was used. Fina ncial information 
was taken from the cooperative's balance sheet, income 
statement and cash flow statement for each year over the seven 
year period of the study . In order to establish end points 
for calculating average assets and equity between balance 
sheet dates, financial statements were obtained from 1984 to 
1991. The actual analysis of the data covers the period from 
1985 to 1991. 
The analysis examines three sets of financial data . The 
first set is designated as sample firms and includes all the 
firms for which financial statements were available . The 
second set, designated as focus firms, are a subset of the 
sample firms and represent the firms that were operating 
continuously over the period of the study. The third set, 
designated as non-focus firms , were also a subset of the 
sample firms and they represent firms that discontinued 
operations at some point over the period of the study . The 
firms represented in this data set decreased correspondingly 
with the decrease in the number of firms represented in sample 
45 
firms data set. 
1. Sample firms 
The sample firms in the study included all firms in each 
year for which data were available and which met the 
measurement criteria of the study. Cooperatives were excluded 
if their measure of local equity {equity minus investment in 
other cooperatives ) was negative . Negative local equity 
produced misleading results when calculating ROE. For 
example, a firm with an operating loss and negative equity 
would show a positive measure of ROE. 
The sample size decreased in successive years throughout 
the period of the study. When consolidations, mergers and 
liquidations occurred, observations were lost from each 
succeeding year's sample after the event. No data was 
available to distinguish cooperatives involved in an 
organizational restructuring or those that simply went out of 
business. 
The model for profitability group classification was 
applied to the sample firms but the results are not presented 
in great detail in the analysis. Sample firms were 
partitioned into focus and non-focus and the model applied and 
the results analyzed for these two subsets of the sample 
firms . Nevertheless, financial variable and ratio means are 
presented and discussed for the sample firms. The judgement 
was made that analysis of sample firms would yield some useful 
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information. For example, changes in the averages for the 
sample reflect changes in the industry through the time period 
of the study even though they might not be useful in the focus 
group analysis as designed for this study. Most tables of 
profitability group variable averages for the sample firms are 
presented in the appendix. 
2 . Focus and non- focus f i rms 
A subset of the firms that were continuously operating 
throughout the study period were identified . The focus firms 
were defined as those firms still operating in 1991 which met 
the measurement criteria used to calculate financial ratio 
means. Although they were included in the analysis of the 
sample firms, a separate analysis was conducted for the focus 
firms over the same time period (1985-1991). The focus group 
was identified by examining the firms still in operation at 
the end of 1991, separating them from the firms operating in 
preceding years and then measuring their financial performance 
year by year back through 1985 . 
An analysis was also conducted on the firms out of the 
initial sample that ceased operations at some point during the 
period of the study. Information identifying the reason these 
firms went out of business was not available and no at t empt 
was made to determine whether they consolidated, merged or 
were part of an acquisition by another cooperative or private 
concern. The data available for these discontinued 
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cooperatives indicate that many of them were experiencing 
serious financial difficulties prior to their exit from the 
industry. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to assume that a 
substantial percentage of these firms were either reorganized 
with other cooperatives or were liquidated . 
It can be hypothesized that the cooperatives still 
operating in the period at the end of the study have financial 
structures that differ from those who have ceased operating . 
By comparing the performance of the focus firms over the 
period with that of the non-focus firms, an attempt was made 
to identify fundamental differences in these firm's financial 
structure. The success of the focus firms should shed some 
light on the failings of other firms in the sample . 
B. Variable Selection, Construction and Description 
The financial variables chosen for analysis in this study 
were obtained from a cooperative's balance sheet, income 
statement, and flow of funds statement. Financial ratios 
representing cooperative profitability and solvency were 
constructed from these variables . A description o f the 
financial variables and the methods of constructing the 
financial ratios follows. 
1. Financial statement variables 
The balance sheet and income statement variables examined 
provided the necessary values for the purpose of calculating 
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the financial ratios used in the cooperative profitability 
model. Additional balance sheet variables that proxy the size 
of operations were also included . The balance sheet variables 
included sales, term debt, total assets, fixed assets and 
equity. The income statement variables were local savings 
(net margins) and interest and depreciation expense. 
The flow-of-funds statement variables examined included 
the source of funds that do not appear in income statements 
and the uses of those funds which provided information on 
retention ratios, equity redemption, and fixed asset growth. 
These variables, for the given year's statement, included term 
loans, cash patronage payments, equity redemptions, and 
purchases of fixed assets. 
Sample means were calculated for the financial 
variables in each of the three data sets examined. Variable 
means were also calculated for the data sets based on the four 
profitability group categories of the model. The mean for a 
variable in a particular profitability group can then be 
compared to the variable's mean in another group as well as to 
the variable's mean of a representative cooperative in that 
year. This method of comparing group variable means also 
allowed the identification of differences in the means among 
the profitability groups. 
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2. Financial ratios 
As briefly mentioned in A.l of Chapter II, this study 
incorporated three financial ratios into the main analysis. 
A fourth ratio, term debt to total debt was included in a 
long-run analysis of cooperative. These ratios were chosen 
based on their ability to accurately measure the performance 
and economic condition of business firms . 
The return on investment ratio, hereafter referred to as 
return on equity (ROE), measures how well a cooperative's risk 
capital is performing. It was included in the study for two 
reasons: 1 ) To measure the relative performance of the equity 
capital of cooperatives, and; 2) To serve as an index for 
measuring debt capital's contribution to a cooperative's 
profitability. 
The ratio was calculated with the following equation: 
ROE = (NI - PI) /[( BE + EE) /2 ] ( 4. 1) 
where ROE = return on local equity, 
NI = net income, 
PI = patronage income from investments 
in other cooperatives, 
BE = beginning local equity, 
EE = ending local equity. 
Net income and patronage income from investments in other 
cooperatives was taken from a cooperative 's income statement. 
The balance sheet provided the information needed to calculate 
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a cooperative's local equity . It was calculated by 
subtracting the balance sheet entry for investments in other 
cooperatives from the entry for total equity. 
A cooperative's average equity in a year was used in the 
denominator for calculating the ROE measure . This was 
achieved by using the previous year's closing local equity for 
beginning equity, adding it to the closing local equity in the 
year ROE was calculated and then dividing by two . Calculating 
ROE using average equity rather than beginning or ending 
equity gave a more representative measure of ROE to the level 
of equity employed by a cooperative in a given year . This was 
because equity was being built (or in some c ases eroded) 
during the year . While average equity is not a perfect 
measure, neither beginning or closing equity were judged to 
yield measures as accurate as average equity . 
The focus of this study was strictly on the performance 
of equity provided by and under the control of a local 
cooperative 's member-patrons. As a rule, patronage income 
from regional or other cooperatives is allocated to a local 
cooperative in the form of equity credits. The income is 
generally unrealized by the local as cash until the regional 
decides to revolve it . Thus any equity investments in other 
cooperatives were not under the direct control of a local's 
Board of Directors . Since an accurate measure of the 
performance of the equity at the local level was the focus of 
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the study a measure of local return on equity was used. This 
measure eliminated both the earnings from regional patronage 
and the equity claims against equity credits on the balance 
sheet . 
The return on total assets (ROA) measures how well a 
firm's assets were used to generate earnings. Because no 
distinction was made on how the assets are funded, ROA is a 
measure of the combined effects debt and equity capital had on 
a cooperative's performance . The measure's inclusion in the 
study was threefold: 1 ) ROA is a widely used measure in the 
literature covering business performance; 2) The ROA measure 
c aptures returns from both debt and equity funded assets, and; 
3) Its use, combined with an ROE measure, allows 
identification of the effects that debt and equity capital 
have on profitability as postulated in the theoretical model. 
Two measures of ROA were calculated in the study for 
purposes of profitability group classification. Both measures 
were calculated using the cooperative's local assets and loca l 
income. Local assets exclude the balance sheet entry 
cooperatives make to o ffset the firm's investment in other 
cooperatives . Local assets were derived by subtracting this 
entry from a firm ' s total assets. And, the measure of local 
income also excluded patronage refunds paid to the local by 
regional or other cooperatives. 
Similar to the average equity figure used to calculate 
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ROE, the local assets entered in the denominator for the ROA 
measure represents the average assets available to the 
cooperative throughout the year. Average assets were derived 
by summing a firm's beginning of the year local assets with 
its end of the year local assets and dividing by two. 
Calculating ROA with average local assets gave better measures 
of the income generated by these assets over the year . 
The first measure of return on assets, hereafter termed 
return on assets (ROA) , was calculated as follows: 
ROA = [ (NI - PI ) + INT] I [ (BA + EA) / 2] ( 4 . 2 ) 
where ROA = return on local assets, 
INT interest expense, 
BA = beginning local assets, 
EA = ending local assets. 
The yearly interest expense of a cooperative is included in 
the numerator for calculating return on assets. This measure 
of return on assets includes a firm's cost of debt capital in 
order to capture the asset's return regardless of its funding . 
ROA was used in one of the formulas used to classify 
cooperatives by profitability group, although a detailed 
analysis of the results is not included in the study. 
The other measure of return on assets used f o r the 
purposes of this study was termed cash return on assets 
(CROA). CROA was calculated as follows: 
53 
CROA = [(NI - PI ) +INT+ DEP] / [(BA + EA)/ 2) 
where CROA = cash return on local assets, 
DEP depreciation expense. 
( 4 . 3 ) 
The only difference between the ROA and CROA measures of 
return on local assets is that the CROA measure is calculated 
before depreciation is deducted from a cooperative's income. 
CROA is a more complete measure of cash flow return on assets. 
It was included in the study's analysis to capture the returns 
generated by a firm's assets without consideration of the 
depreciation policy used on those assets which can vary from 
firm to firm. This variation occurs not only due to internal 
policies adopted by the firm but also the IRS rules in effect 
when major assets were acquired. 
The debt-asset (D/A) ratio calculated in the study is a 
widely used financial ratio applied to studies of business 
performance . The ratio was calculated as follows: 
D/A = [(BCD+ ECD + BTD + ETD )/2]/[ (BA + EA)/2] 
where D/A = debt/local asset ratio, 
BCD = beginning current debt , 
ECD ending current debt, 
BTD = beginning term debt, 
ETD = ending term debt. 
( 4. 4) 
The D/A ratio included the total debt of a cooperative . 
The ratio was calculated on a cooperative's local assets 
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(assets minus investments in other cooperatives ) to capture a 
more accurate measure of the percentage o f those assets funded 
with borrowed cap ital. The mea sure incorporated the firm's 
average total debt and average local assets to reflect its 
solvency position throughout the year. 
The D/ A ratio is a measure of leverage for a business 
firm. That is, it measures the percentage of the firms assets 
that were financed by debt capital. Conversely, subtracting 
the D/ A ratio from one yields the fraction of the firm ' s 
assets that were financed by equity capital. The D/ A ratio is 
included in this study a s a mea sure of the capacity a 
cooperative has for expanding its capital base through debt 
financing . 
Another financial ratio e xamined in the study was term 
debt to total debt . It was cal culated by dividing a 
cooperative's balance sheet entry for long term debt by its 
total debt, i.e. current debt and long-term debt . For 
exa mple, a ratio of fifteen hundredths says that for every 
dollar of debt the firm holds, fifteen cents of that debt is 
term debt. The ra tio gives an indication of the extent to 
which a cooperative depends on term debt for financing its 
operations . Gene rally a lower term to total debt ratio is 
preferable to higher ratios due to the interest cost 
differential between short and long-term loans . 
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c . Empirical Procedure 
The primary empirical procedure used in the study 
involved a comparison of means across the data sets under 
examination. All three data sets were treated in a similar 
manner. In each year of the study, financial variable and 
ratio means were calculated for the firms in each set . The 
sample firm means for each variable are representative of 
industry standards for local grain marketing and input supply 
c ooperatives operating in a given year. An industry standard 
is useful for comparison purposes in identifying the balance 
sheet and income statement strengths and weaknesses of the 
focus firms and non - focus firms. 
In addition to calculating variable means for the firms 
comprising each data set, an analysis of firm performance 
was conducted using the profitability model pres ented in 
Chapter II. An analysis of the cooperative profitability 
model as applied to the focus firm and non-focus firm data 
sets was undertaken. Based on a cooperative's return on local 
equity and local assets measures, firms were classified in one 
of the four prof itability groups outlined by the model. Group 
means were then calculated for all firms comprising a 
particular group classification in each year of the study. A 
comparison of the variable means between the profitability 
groups and across the two data sets was then conducted. 
The study incorporated two measures for return on assets 
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(ROA and CROA) when classifying cooperatives by profitability 
groups. Because the criteria for group classification 
differed between the ROA and CROA methods, there was a 
substantial difference in the number of firms represented 
within each of the four groups. Also, there was a similar 
divergence in the financial variable and ratio means as 
measured by the two group classification methods. These 
differences are briefly summarized in the analysis section of 
the thesis . 
1 . Profitability groupings after depreciation expense 
Using the measure for return on assets before interest 
but after depreciation (ROA) , cooperatives were classified in 
one of four profitability groups as outlined in the model 
presented in section D, Chapter II. A firm's classification 
depended on its relative measures of ROA and return on equity 
(ROE) in the sample year. Due to a wide variety of factors 
including (1) the changing economic climate, (2) cooperative's 
capital structure , (3) changing interest rates, (4) weather 
related volume changes, and (5) government storage programs, 
measures of firm prof itability varied from year to year. This 
resulted in different profitability group classification from 
one year to the next for many of the cooperatives. 
Means were calculated within each profitability group for 
the financial variables and ratios . Tables summarizing these 
means were then constructed for all four groups each year of 
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the study. Using ROA and ROE as the group classifying 
c riteria resulted in cooperative representation in all 
profitability groups throughout the period. Although this 
method of firm profitability classification produced a larger 
dispersion of firms across the groups, it was felt that using 
ROA as the criteria for classifying cooperatives was not 
sufficiently explanatory to fulfill the research objectives. 
2. Profitability groupings before depreciation expense 
The second method of analysis used in the study involved 
classifying the cooperatives into profitability groups based 
on their return on assets before interest and depreciation 
(CROA) and ROE. This method of profitability group 
classification resulted in extensive reclassification of 
cooperatives within each of the four profitability groups. 
Most notable were large shifts of Group I firms back into 
Group II classification, and shifts of firms out of Group IV 
into Group III classification . No apparent shift of firms 
occurred between the Group II and Group III classifications . 
Financial variable and ratios means diverged considerably from 
the ROA c l assification method when comparing the t wo results. 
3. Long-run profitability group classification 
In addition to class ifying cooperatives by profitability 
group in each year of the sample period, a seven year, long-
run profitability group classification was determined for each 
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firm. Included in the long-run analysis were flow-of-funds 
statement variables that were deemed useful in isolating 
factors that influence a cooperative 's growth rate and equity 
policy. 
Four variables from a cooperative's flow-of-funds 
statement were included in the long-run analysis. These 
variables included a cooperative's fixed asset purchases, cash 
patronage paid, additions to long-term debt, and equity 
retired and revolved. Cumulative totals over the sample years 
were calculated and then divided by the number of years in the 
period (seven ) to obtain long-run averages for each o f these 
variables. 
The flow-of - funds statement variables capture all sources 
and uses of funds for a firm in a given year. The difference 
between the source and use totals are either additions 
(sources greater than uses ) o r deductions (sources less than 
uses) to a firm's working capital. Although it is essential 
that a cooperative have adequate levels of working capital 
available to conduct its day to day operations, the focus in 
thi s study was not specifically aimed at analyzing a firm's 
working capital requirements. Rather, these four variables 
were related to the acquisition o f debt and equity capital and 
how they influenced the cooperative's growth. 
The procedure used to classify a cooperative by its long-
run profitability group was simple and straightfo rward. The 
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model for cooperative pro fitability group c lassification 
outlined in Chapter II was applied to the long-run groupings. 
Yearly return on investment measures (ROA, CROA, ROE ) were 
c alculated then summed over the seven year perio d o f the 
study. This sum was then divided by the number of years of 
the study to obtain a yearly average for each measure of 
return on investment . Using these yearly averages, a 
cooperative ' s long-run profitability group classification was 
determined. Profitability group means and standard deviations 
were then calculated for all financial variables and financial 
ratios under investigation . 
Additional financial ratios were calculated for the long-
run analysis. These ratios included interest expense to total 
debt, depreciation expense to fixed assets, local assets to 
total assets, fixed assets to total assets, equity retired to 
local equity and fixed asset purchases to depreciation 
expense. Fiscal-year ratios were calculated for each 
cooperative and summed over the period . These sums were 
divided by s even to obtain the long-run average for each of 
the ratios. Prof itability group means and standard deviations 
were calculated for these ratios for the group 
class ifi cations . 
The additional financial ratios analyzed in the long-run 
profitability group classifications were chosen because it was 
felt that these ratios captured firm characteristics that 
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differed between the profitability groups. The ratios 
conveyed useful information on cooperatives' asset and flow of 
funds structure. An analysis of variance was conducted for 
the financial ratios (and financial variables ) to determine if 
significant differences existed between the profitability 
groups. The Scheffe procedure was used for the analysis and 
groups with significant differences between their variable and 
ratio means were identified. 
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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Variable Profiles 
This chapter presents and discusses the financial 
variables and ratios calculated for the study's analysis. 
Tables of financial variable and ratio means were constructed 
for the sample firms, focus firms, and non-focus firms. The 
variable and ratio means for each data set are first presented 
and discussed, then the means calculated by profitability 
group for focus and non-focus firms are presented and 
analyzed . 
The sample firm's financial variable and ratio means are 
analyzed first, to identify local grain and production supply 
cooperatives' industry averages. This was followed by an 
analysis of the variable and ratio means of focus and non-
focus firm data sets. These two data sets are presented and 
discussed concurrently in order to compare the differences in 
each set's means . This method of presentation allows 
identification of the means t hat deviated substantially across 
data sets. Isolating key differences of the calculated means 
between the two data sets may help account for the apparent 
success (focus firms) or failure (non - focus firms ) of these 
cooperatives. 
Next, a presentation and analysis of the profitability 
group classifications of the focus and non-focus firms was 
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conducted . The analysis focused on the profitability group 
classifications derived from the relationship between the CROA 
measure of return on local assets and ROE. Because CROA 
included depreciation as well as interest expense in its 
calculation, this criteria of classifying cooperatives better 
separated firms with superior rates of return on local equity. 
Furthermore, using CROA as the criteria for firm 
classification it can be hypothesized that the cooperatives 
classified as Group I firms are not only realizing superior 
returns on their equity investments but are capable of 
sustained growth while replacing fixed assets and revolving 
past equity issued. 
The next section of the analysis examined cooperative's 
financial performance based on its long-run CROA/ ROE group 
classification. Long-run classifications were obtainable only 
for those firms operating throughout the sample period. Thus 
the l o ng-run analysis was applicable only to the focus firm's 
data set. Variable and ratio profiles were obtained for all 
firms in each of the profitability group categories in the 
long-run. Specific flow-of-funds statement variables were 
also examined to determine if categorical differences between 
the profitability group means existed. 
1. Financial variable and ratio means 
The following tables present the financial variable and 
ratio means calculated for the data set representing sample 
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firms. This data set included all the firms for which 
financial statements were available and which met the 
measurement criteria of the study in each of the years under 
investigation . The variable means are representative 
financial statement variables of an average local grain 
marketing and input supply cooperative that operated over the 
period . The first table of financial variable means is 
presented in Table 4.1. 
The first column of the table lists the years that the 
financial performance of local cooperatives were examined . 
The second column (N) represents the number of firms for which 
variable means were calculated in each year. The sample size 
decreased each year due to operational restructuring or firm 
failure. The number of firms dropping from the sample varied 
from year to year wi th the largest loss of firms occurring 
between the first three years (1985-1987) and the last two 
years (1990-1991) of the study. 
In the final year of the study, the sample firms that 
were still in operation were also identified as the focus 
firms and partitioned as such from sample firms for analysis 
in all prior years. A result of this partitioning was that 
the financial variable and ratio means of these two data sets 
were identical for 1991. This fact is evident when examining 
the variable and ratio means in 1991 for the two separate data 
sets. 
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Table 4.1 Financial variable means of sample firms (in 
dollars) 
Year N Sa les Termdebt Local Asset Fixed Assets 
1985 219 8,915,747 455,480 2,607,493 1,166,668 
1986 202 8 , 096,707 404 , 096 2,569,919 1,235 , 929 
1987 187 8,672,680 363,382 2,956,717 1,312,069 
1988 181 11,628,824 348 , 690 3,754,472 1,378,577 
1989 173 14,447,473 340,143 3,865,247 1,443,638 
1990 167 14,591,464 388 , 248 4,288,904 1,569,293 
1991 152 15, 436,028 477,217 4,988,678 1,769,460 
The average cooperative's sales dropped nearly ten percent in 
1986 from 1985 levels, then recovered slightly in 1987. These 
sales results were partly a reflection of a large grain 
inventory build-up due to a government price support program. 
As government program-induced inventories were liquidated in 
1988 and 1989, an average cooperative's sales increased 
substantially, over thirty percent in 1988 and nearly twenty-
five percent in 1989. Sales leveled off in 1990 then 
exhibited o n ly a moderate increase in 1991 . By 1991, an 
average coop erative's sales had increased by approximately 
seventy-five percent over its 1985 level. 
As cooperatives sought to reduce the high levels of long-
term debt acquired in the early 1980's, average term debt 
decreased successively from 1985 to 1989 . By 1989, the 
average cooperat ive's term debt was less than seventy-five 
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percent of its 1985 level while average cooperative's sales 
had increased by sixty percent of 1985 levels. In 1990 , term 
debt rose by more than ten percent of 1989 levels and in 1991 
jumped by nearly twenty-five percent over its 1990 level . By 
1991, the term debt mean was only slightly higher than it was 
in 1985 . 
With the exception of 1986, an average cooperative's 
local assets increased consistently over the period of the 
study. Substantial increases occurred in 1988 and 1991 over 
previous year's levels. The trend of a growing local asset 
base coupled with decreased levels of long-term debt indica ted 
a growing reliance by cooperatives on equity or short-term 
debt to finance assets. By 1991, the average cooperative' s 
local as sets were approximately ninety percent greater than 
their 1985 level. 
The fixed assets of an average cooperative also increased 
in each year over the period of the study. The most 
substantial increases occurred between 1989 and 1991 . By 
1991, the sample firm's fixed asset mean had increased by over 
sixty percent of its 1985 level. The yearly increase in this 
mean paralleled the yearly decline of the number of sample 
firms. The growth o f an average cooperative's fixed assets 
was reflected in the expansion of operations and the service 
area claimed by many locals. 
The remaining sample firm financial variable means 
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calculated in the study are presented in Table 4 . 2 . The last 
three columns of financial variable means captured a 
cooperat ive's cash flow that was used to calculate rate of 
return on local assets. 
The equity position of an average local cooperative 
improved considerably throughout the period. Substantial 
increases occurred in 1987, a year in which the sample lost 
fifteen firms and in 1988, a year after high local margins 
were c aptured . By 1991, average equity had increased by over 
seventy percent of its 1985 level. This equity growth was, in 
part, an outcome of the growth in size and operations o f many 
local cooperatives as they expanded their service territories 
to capture the unserved markets and memberships that resulted 
from failure of a neighboring cooperative or proprietary firm. 
Part of the growth was also a result of the more successful 
firms increasing their member investment by offering new and 
expanded services that effectively increased member patronage. 
Over the period, the local net income (margins ) mean of 
the sample cooperatives ranged from a low of $24,535 in 1985 
to a high of $291,802 in 1987. Cooperative incomes realized 
substantial improvements in 1986 and 1987 as production and 
marketing conditions were generally favorable in the grain and 
farm input supply industry. Despite the drought in 1988, 
cooperative incomes remained strong, in part, due to the 
liquidation of inventories accumulated during the 
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Table 4.2 Financ ial variable means of sample firms 
1985-1991 ( in dollars ) 
Year N Local Equity Margins Interest Depreciation 
1985 219 1 , 298,287 24,535 113,617 152,179 
1986 202 1,407,862 154,750 84,254 160,238 
1987 187 1,636,907 291 ,802 61,384 170,699 
1988 181 1,824,761 279,357 82,823 18 0 ,479 
1989 173 1,927,655 167,814 11 0 ,894 189,278 
1990 167 2,050,267 172,585 111,599 200,980 
1991 152 2,210 , 091 135,436 110,369 225,439 
government's price support program. However, by 1991, the 
average cooperat ive's income had substantially deteriorated 
(by over fifty-five percent) from its peak level in 1987. 
As cooperat ives struggled to reduce the often 
disastrously high debt levels they acquired in the late 
seventies and early eighties, and as the cost of borrowing 
funds gradually improved, the sample mean for interest expense 
wa s reduced by nearly fifty percent between 1985 and 1987. 
However, this improvement in the borrowing cos ts e xperienced 
by an average cooperative was short lived as the interest 
expen se mean rose in t he remaining years of the study . This 
occurred despite the fact that , with the exception of 1991, 
c ooperatives were reducing or maintaining their levels of 
long-term debt (see table 4.1 ) . The increased borrowing costs 
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from 1988 through 1991 resulted from increased use of short-
term debt (seasonal loans) to finance growing current assets. 
This interest obligation on current assets such as inventory 
and accounts receivable represented a less serious threat to 
solvency than the long-term interest problem in the period. 
The growth in the sample mean for depreciation expense 
over the period paralleled the growth of an average 
cooperative's fixed assets. Data pertaining to cooperative's 
choice o f depreciation schedules was not available, but 
throughout the sample period the average depreciation rate was 
approximately thirteen percent of the mean value of the fixed 
assets. However, when the sample firms were partitioned into 
focus and non-focus firms and subsequently analyzed, 
variations in depreciation rates became more apparent. 
Table 4.3 presents the financial ratio means for sample 
firms in each year of the study. Since subsequent analysis of 
focus and non-focus firm's profitability group classification 
used CROA and ROE as the classifying criteria, the discussion 
on the sample firm's financial ratio means is confined to 
these two ratios and the debt /asset ratio . The other ratios 
for return on local assets are included in the table merely to 
reflect the effects interest and depreciation expenses had on 
return on investment measures. 
The sample mean for the CROA ratio ranged from a high of 
17.73 percent in 1987 to a low of 9.40 percent in 1991. The 
69 
Table 4.3 Financial ratio means o f sample 
firms 1985-1991 (in percentages ) 
Year 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
a) 
N 
219 
202 
187 
181 
173 
167 
152 
RROA 
0 .4 6 
5.20 
9.52 
7 . 71 
3.95 
3.71 
2.27 
ROA 
4.56 
8.29 
11.54 
9 .83 
6.42 
6.14 
4.33 
CROA 
10.25 
14.47 
17.73 
15 . 31 
11.57 
11.32 
9. 40 
ROE 
- 2.62a 
8 . 37 
16.44 
13.37 
5.40 
3.92 
1. 73 
D/A 
48.48 
44.02 
39.87 
43.02 
44.26 
44.41 
47.17 
Although the net local margin mean was positive, 
the extremely negative, unweighted ROE of a few 
firms produced the data set's negative ROE mean. 
increase in this ratio over the first three years of the study 
was a direct result o f the improved earnings realized by the 
sample cooperatives. As earnings leveled off in 1988 and then 
declined through 1991, the CROA ratio also declined. Even 
though interest and depreciation expenses increased the last 
three years of the study, the declining CROA mean resulted 
from reduced earnings with an expanded local asset base. 
Due to unusually large operating losses experienced by 
many cooperatives in 1985, the sample mean for ROE was a 
negative 2.62 percent for the year. High borrowing costs 
negatively affected many cooperative 's ROE as well. As 
earnings improved and borrowing costs declined the sample mean 
for ROE increased dramatically to its seven year high of 16.44 
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percent in 1987. Declining margins and increasing interest 
expenses the following years were chiefly responsible for 
lower ROE means, although larger equity means were a 
contributing factor as well. By 1991, a representative 
cooperative was realizing an extremely low but positive return 
on its owner's investment. 
The mean for the total debt / local asset ratio of sample 
firms ranged from a high of 48.48 percent in 1985 to a low of 
39.87 percent in 1987. Between these years sample 
cooperatives were reducing their long- term debt without 
greatly increasing their level of seasonal (short-term) 
borrowing . Beginning in 1988 and through 1991, coopera tive 
seasonal borrowing increased greatly . This trend was 
highlighted when the decrease in the sample term debt mean was 
compared to the local asset and D/ A ratio means, which 
simultaneously increased from 1988 to 1990. Then the 
substantial increase in the term debt mean in 1 991 raised the 
average D/ A mean for the sample to its highest level in six 
years. 
The next sectio n o f the analysis investigated the 
financial variable and ratio means calculated f o r f ocus and 
non- focus firms. Tables summarizing the calculated means were 
constructed for each data set. Individual tables that 
summari zed the same variable and ratio means for each data set 
are presented together. The means across tables are compared 
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to identify financial characteristics that differentiated the 
two groups of firms. 
The first four financial variable means are presented in 
Tables 4.4 and 4 . 5. The number of firms represented in the 
focus firm tables varied slightly over the sample period for 
two reasons: 1 ) Two firms had negative measures of local 
equity in 1985 , 1986, 1987 and 1989, and one firm had a 
negative measure of local equity in 1988; and, 2 ) There was a 
missing observation in 1986 disallowing asset and equity 
averaging. The decreasing size of the non-focus firm data set 
from 1985 to 1991 was a result of the convergence of the 
sample firm's data set through the period to the become the 
focus firm data set in 1991. 
In comparing the financial variables of the two sets of 
firms, the most striking difference is the size of the 
cooperatives represented, as measured by the sales and fixed 
and local asset means. By sales, the focus firms are over 
fifty percent larger to nearly twice the size of non-focus 
firms in a given year. Likewise, as measured by the local and 
fixed asset means, focus firms are fifty percent to nearly 
twice as large as non-focus firms. As a group, the 
cooperatives that either failed or were reorganized with other 
cooperatives over the seven years of the study appeared to 
have been concentrated among firms whose sales and local and 
fixed asset means were below the industry average, as given 
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Table 4.4 Financial variable means of focus firms 
1985- 1 991 (in dollars ) 
Year N Sales Termdebt Local Assets Fixed Assets 
1 985 150 1 0,533,4 4 3 501,584 3 , 043,238 1, 34 2 ,8 69 
1 986 149 10,570 , 884 504,114 2 ,881,284 1,346,630 
1 987 149 9,547,590 381, 090 3 , 243, 4 78 1 ,432,175 
1988 151 12,510 ,4 10 374,900 4,035,679 1 ,4 71 ,515 
1989 150 15,275,577 369,235 4,097,301 1 , 532 , 436 
1990 152 15,120,292 405,763 4 ,4 64,645 1,634,111 
1991 152 15, 436, 028 477,217 4,988,678 1 , 769, 4 60 
Table 4.5 Financial variable means of non- f ocus firms 
1985-1990 (in dollars) 
Year N Sales Termdebt Local Assets Fixed Assets 
1985 69 5 , 399 , 004 346 , 287 1,660,221 783,622 
1986 53 5 , 057,946 318 , 588 1,694,570 831,303 
1987 38 5,24 2,115 293,728 1,832,313 841 , 129 
1988 30 7 , 191,508 220 , 914 2,339 , 061 910,792 
1989 23 9,046 ,793 153 , 612 2,341,762 864,523 
1990 15 9,232,676 197,329 2,508 , 052 912,468 
in table 4. 1 . 
Focus firm's term debt means generally followed that of 
the industry average , decreasing through 1989 then increasing 
the last two years of the period. The term debt means of the 
non-focus firms, however, decreased in each successive year of 
the period, even as their sales and fixed asset means were 
73 
rising. Their ability to secure long- term financing obviously 
had been reduced due to financial pressure and difficulties 
revealed more fully in subsequent tables showing cash fl ows. 
Both group of firms local asset means followed a similar 
trend as the industry average , with the exception of the non-
focus firm's local asset mean increasing in 1986. Again, the 
difference in the size of operations between the two data sets 
are reflected in the local asset means. 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 present the remainder of the financial 
variable means for focus and non -focus firms respectively. Of 
interest here was the difference between the two groups with 
respect to their margins and interest and depreciation expense 
means. It should be noted, though , that as measured by the 
groups equity means, the focus firms had larger levels of 
local equity than the industry average and the non-focus firms 
had levels below that of the industry average. 
The net margin means of focus firms was substantially 
greater than those of non-focus firms throughout the study. 
In 1985, the later firms had a negative mean for margins, and 
in 1990 their average margin was approximately one-fifteenth 
the average of the focus firms. The negative average for 
margins in 1985 and its low average in 1990 translated into a 
greater loss of cooperatives from this data set in the years 
i mmediately following these poor margins, i.e. sixteen fewer 
in 1986 and fifteen fewer in 1991 (zero non-focus firms in the 
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Table 4.6 Financial variable means of focus firms 
1 985 -1991 (in dollars ) 
Year N Local Equity Margins Interest Depreciat i on 
1985 150 1,541,394 44,728 126,117 178,935 
1986 149 1,599,628 188,759 89 , 198 180,562 
1987 149 1,796,272 328,980 64 ,182 188,547 
1988 151 1,954,552 311,629 86,788 194,519 
1989 150 2 , 040,3 43 185,418 114,873 201,391 
1990 152 2,130,848 188,372 115,198 209,389 
1991 152 2,210,091 135,436 110,369 225 ,4 39 
Table 4.7 Financial variable means of non- focus 
firms 1985-1990 (in dollars) 
Year N Local Equity Margins Interest Depreciation 
1985 69 769,793 -19 ,361 86,442 94, 015 
1986 53 868,746 59,137 70,634 103,101 
1987 38 1,012,026 146, 023 50,855 100,715 
1988 30 1,171,482 116,923 62,728 109,810 
1989 23 1,187,832 53,007 84,668 110 ,278 
1990 15 1,233,710 12,609 76,081 115,773 
final year of the study). Clearly, focus firm's ability to 
generate positive earnings was a contributing factor for their 
survivability. 
The interest expense mean of the two groups generally 
followed the trend for the industry average. In 1990 , the 
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non-focus firm's interest mean did drop from the previous year 
while the focus firm's mean rose. Interest, as a percentage 
of the term debt mean, generally varied between sixteen and 
thirty percent for both firm groups. This percentage 
generally improved between 1985 and 1988 as cooperatives 
attempted to reduce their long-term commitments. However, 
beginning in 1989, interest payments began to represent a 
larger percentage of the average firm's term debt. This was 
especially true for the non-focus firms. In 1989, their 
interest mean represented over fifty percent o f long-term debt 
and nearly forty percent in 1990. 
The depreciation expense mean of two data groups 
exhibited increases over the period, with the exception of a 
slight decrease in this variable for non-focus firms in 1987. 
The rate of increase in this mean was larger for the focus 
firms, reflecting higher levels of fi xed assets purchased by 
these firms. 
The financial ratio means for the two groups of firms are 
presented in tables 4.8 and 4.9. The following discussion 
will focus on the group's cash return on assets (CROA) , return 
on equity (ROE) , and the debt-asset ratio (D/ A) . 
In all years of the study, the focus firm's group mean 
varied from two t o three-and-a-half percentage points higher 
than the non-focus firm's group mean. Focus firm's CROA mean 
was above ten percent in all years except 1 991 . Non-focus 
76 
Table 4.8 Financial ratio means of focus firms 
1985 -1 991 (in percentages) 
Year N RROA ROA CROA ROE D/A 
1985 150 1.20 5.13 10.95 -0.58a 47.93 
1986 149 6.32 9.18 15.38 11.27 43.21 
1987 149 10.08 11.98 18.20 18.00 39.96 
1988 151 8.39 10.41 15.86 14.86 43.06 
1989 150 4.34 6 .72 11.86 6.00 44.30 
1990 152 4. 07 6.44 11.62 4.53 44 . 30 
1991 152 2.27 4 . 33 9.40 1 . 73 47.17 
a) The negative ROE mean resulted from a extremely 
negative ROE of o ne of the focus firms. 
Table 4.9 Financial ratios of non-focus firms 
1985-1990 (in percentages ) 
Year N RROA ROA CROA ROE D/A 
1985 69 - 1 . 15 3 . 31 8.72 -7 . 04a 49.70 
1986 53 2.03 5.78 11.90 0 . 21 46 . 30 
1987 38 7.32 9.78 15 . 88 10 . 31 39 . 53 
1988 30 4.3 0 6.94 12.56 5 . 91 42.8 3 
1989 23 1.3 6 4.45 9 . 68 1.49 43.96 
1990 15 0 . 07 3.06 8.31 -2.19a 45.56 
a) One firm had an extremely negative ROE which 
was disproportional to its weight for the mean . 
firm's had a CROA above ten percent in just three of the six 
years ratios were calculated for these firms. Higher margins 
accounted for most o f the improvement in the CROA mean of the 
two groups, especially in the middle years o f the study. And 
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although both groups had lower margins with higher levels of 
local assets in 1989 and 1990 , their increased interest and 
depreciation expenses were sufficient to maintain their CROA 
at higher levels than in 1985. 
The greatest divergence in financial ratios between the 
two sets of firms occurred in the measure of ROE. In all 
years of the study, focus firms had far superior measures of 
this ratio than did the non-focus firms. Because the rat i o 
mean calculations were unweighted, focus firms had a negative 
ROE mean in 1985 even though their net margin's mean was 
positive. This was true of the non - focus firms in 1990 as 
well. Due to the negative net margin mean in 1985, non-focus 
firm's ROE mean was also negative. Except for 1987, non-focus 
firm ' s had very low measures of ROE compared to the industry's 
average. Low returns on owner's investment partly explained 
why, as a group, these non-focus firms were reorganized or 
went out of business. 
The trend in the debt-asset ratio mean of both groups of 
firms paralleled that of the industry average. Relatively 
high ratios in 1985 were followed by improvements (lower 
ratio) in 1986 and 1987. Both group's D/A ratio mean began 
rising again in 1988 and continued to increase through the end 
of the period. Non-focus firms had a higher D/A ratio than 
the focus firms in 1985 and 1986, but beginning in 1987, the 
focus firms had a higher D/A ratio mean for the remaining 
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years. Though term debt was declining through these years 
(e xcept in 1990 and 1991), the higher D/ A ratio for 1987 
onward seemed to indicate a heavier reliance by both data 
groups on short term debt financing . 
2. Profitability group class i f i cat ion financial variable 
and ratio means 
The model used to classify cooperatives by profitability 
groups was applied to sample firms. Financial variable and 
ratio means were calculated for each of the four profitability 
groups. The tables summarizing the results of that analysi s 
are n o t presented here but have been included in the appendix 
for reference. 
The f o llowing analysis examined the results when the 
profitability group model was applied t o the focus firms and 
non-focus f i rms . The tables for variable and ratio means are 
presented together to better compare and contrast the 
differences between the two groups of firms . Because the 
focus o f this study is on a cooperative's ability to generate 
cash flows sufficient enough to r e ward owner's equi ty, revolve 
equity on a timely basis, and simultaneously permit 
o rganizational growth, the analysis concentrates on the Group 
I f irms. However comment o n the other profitability group 
means is made when appropriate. 
Since the profitability group c lassifications were 
determined by the relationship between a cooperative's rate of 
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return on assets {CROA) and its rate of return on owner's 
investment (ROE) , the analysis was started by examining the 
financial ratios calculated for focus and non-focus firms . 
This served to provide a necessary background when analyzing 
profitability group financial variable means . This was 
especially helpful when examining the financial variables 
which determined a firm's cash flow, i.e. net local margins, 
and interest and depreciation expense. 
The CROA means by profitability group classification for 
the focus and non-focus firms are presented in Tables 4.10 and 
4.11 respectively. Group I non-focus firms had the greatest 
variability in absolute CROA means across the data sets and 
also had the t wo highest measures of this mean in 1986 and 
1989, based on a small number of firms . The high means in 
these years resulted from exceptionally high interest and 
depreciation expenses posted by the firms comprising the 
group. Other than these two exceptions, there was not great 
variability between the CROA mean measures between the Group I 
and II focus and non-focus firms. 
The measures of CROA across most profitability groups 
increased in the years that were most favorable for the 
industry at large (1986-1988) . Over this period, the 
percentage of firms classified as Group I and II cooperatives 
was the greatest while Group III and IV had the lowest 
percentage of cooperatives classified in them. No focus firms 
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Table 4.10 Profitability group CROA means of focus firms 
in 1985-1991 (in percentages ) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 16.74 (15 ) 12.99 ( 8 8) 6.50 ( 41 ) -3.04 ( 6 ) 
1986 19 . 15 ( 3 4 ) 15.95 (93) 7.12 ( 22) 0 ( 0) 
1987 20.73 (58) 16 . 95 ( 87) 8.90 (4 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 18.02 (59 ) 14.99 ( 85 ) 8 . 17 ( 7 ) 0 ( 0) 
1989 16 . 08 ( 3 8 ) 12.97 (82 ) 5 . 02 ( 24 ) -2.59 ( 6) 
1990 14 . 78 ( 23 ) 12 . 88 (98 ) 5.53 (3 0) a ( 1 ) 
1991 13.13 ( 1 7 ) 11 . 44 (91 ) 4.99 (3 9 ) -6.01 ( 5 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.11 Profitability group CROA means for non -focus 
firms in 1985-1990 (in percentages ) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 18.84 ( 2) 13.14 ( 31) 7 . 77 ( 2 9) -9 . 81 ( 7) 
1986 22.85 (4 ) 14.19 ( 3 2 ) 6 .17 (15 ) - 3 . 77 ( 2) 
1987 19.55 ( 9 ) 14 . 80 (28) a ( 1 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 16.41 ( 4 ) 13.43 (2 3 ) 4.43 (2) a ( 1 ) 
1989 25.07 ( 2 ) 10.67 (13 ) 5.22 ( 7 ) a ( 1) 
1990 a ( 1 ) 16.13 ( 6) 4.47 ( 6) -4.88 ( 2) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
were classified a s Group IV in these three years . 
The high CROA means of the focus firms in 1986 - 1988 were 
more a result o f improved net local margins than o f increased 
interest and depreciatio n expenses. Tables presented later in 
the study will demonstrate that this group of firms generally 
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had lower interest expense with higher depreciation expense, 
an indication of fixed asset growth with lower interest costs. 
The profitability group ROE means of focus and non-focus 
firms are presented in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. Again , with the 
e x ception of Group IV firms, the Group I non-focus firms 
demonstrated the greatest variability in their ROE mean across 
the profitability groups in both data sets. The sensitivity 
of ROE measures t o the debt-asset ratio partly accounted for 
the extremely high measure of ROE for this group in 1986 (see 
Table 4 . 15). Financing assets with mostly debt capital 
resulted in higher measures of ROE. ROE sensitivity to the 
debt-asset ratio also accounted f or the higher negative values 
of ROE associated with Groups III and IV in both data sets . 
Because the ROE measure was strictly derived from net 
local margins, after interest and depreciation expenses, the 
highest values for the ratio among Groups I and II firms 
occurred in the most profitable years in the industry (1986 -
1988) . Of all firms comprising the focus firm data set, the 
percentage of firms represented as Group I was the highest 
during this period. And as their ROE means demonstrated , this 
Group, on average, had extremely positive rates of return on 
t heir owner 's i nves tment. The ROE means were not greatly 
boosted by high debt -asset ratio means (see Table 4.14 ) . 
A final note on these tables is in order . Of the firms 
compris ing the data set each year, the percentage of non-focus 
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Table 4.12 Profitability group ROE means for focus firms 
in 1985-1990 ( in percentages ) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 20 . 38 (15) 6.38 ( 88) -15 . 48 ( 41 ) -53 . 28 ( 6 ) 
1986 25.70 (34) 10.84 (93) -9.25 (22 ) 0 ( 0) 
1987 27.96 (58) 12 . 58 ( 8 7) -8.68 ( 4) 0 ( 0) 
1988 23.14 ( 59 ) 10.91 ( 8 5 ) - 7 . 09 ( 7 ) 0 ( 0 ) 
1989 19 . 62 ( 3 8 ) 8.50 (82) -13 . 32 (24 ) -37.22 ( 6 ) 
1990 18 . 44 (23 ) 7 .97 ( 9 8 ) -15.86 ( 3 0) a (1 ) 
1991 16.18 (17 ) 7 . 10 ( 91 ) -11 . 64 ( 3 9 ) -40.84 ( 5 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure . 
Table 4 . 13 Profitability group ROE means of non-focus firms 
in 1985-1990 (in percentages) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 28.09 (2) 7 . 66 ( 31) - 13.30 ( 2 9) -56 . 24 ( 7 ) 
1986 39 . 49 ( 4 ) 8 . 55 ( 3 2 ) - 9.49 (15 ) -138 . 93 ( 2 ) 
1987 26 . 20 ( 9 ) 9.45 (28 ) a ( 1 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 20 . 11 ( 4) 7.79 (23 ) - 12.04 ( 2 ) a ( 1 ) 
1989 25 . 95 ( 2 ) 5. 08 (13 ) - 8.70 ( 7 ) a ( 1 ) 
1990 a ( 1) 10.12 ( 6 ) -11 . 65 ( 6 ) -17.27 ( 2 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure . 
firms represented in either Group III or Group IV was highly 
disproportional to the number of firms each year . That is, a 
greater number of these firms were represented in Groups III 
and IV than in Groups I and II. And the ROE mean o f firms 
represented in III and IV had o ften extremely large negative 
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values. Poor rates of return on owner's investment coupled 
with high debt - asset ratios may have been instrumental for the 
firms that discontinued operations . 
The profitability group debt - asset ratio means for focus 
and non-focus firms are presented in Tables 4.14 and 4.15. 
With a couple exceptions, the ranking of the data sets' D/ A 
ratio followed the same pattern. Group IV firms had the 
highest and most extreme D/A ratio means in nearly all years 
of the study that this group was represented. Group III firms 
had the second highest D/ A ratio means in most years, and the 
highest means in those years when no firms were classified 
into Group IV. Group II firms posted the lowest D/A ratio 
mean throughout the period and Group I firms consistently had 
the second lowest measure of this mean . 
As postulated by the model of cooperative profitability, 
Group I firm's profitability was enhanced by the levels of 
debt they held. Optimal D/A ratios for focus firms appeared 
to be in a range of fifty to fifty-five percent. The D/A 
ratio of the non-focus firms radically fluctuated from year to 
year. In 1987 when this data set had the highest 
representation of Group I firms, the D/A ratio mean fell 
wi thin the range found in Group I focus firms but in other 
years the mean demonstrated no consistent value. 
While the Group II firms had the lowest D/A ratio means, 
their rate of return on assets still exceeded their rate of 
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Table 4.14 Profitability group means of debt-asset ratio 
for focus firms, 1985-1991 (in percentages) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Gr oup IV 
1 98 5 55 . 03 (15 ) 42.51 (8 8 ) 54.54 (41) 64.51 ( 6) 
1986 55 . 72 (34 ) 36.37 ( 93) 52.78 (2 2 ) 0 ( 0) 
1987 50.87 (58 ) 32.07 ( 8 7 ) 53 . 45 ( 4) 0 ( 0) 
1988 51.40 (59 ) 35.63 ( 8 5) 62 . 91 ( 7 ) 0 ( 0) 
1989 50 .64 ( 38 ) 37.44 (82 ) 51.57 (2 4 ) 65 . 34 ( 6 ) 
1990 51.20 (23 ) 38.60 ( 9 8) 56.70 ( 3 0) a ( 1 ) 
1991 55 . 04 (17 ) 4 0 .18 (9 1 ) 58.92 ( 3 9 ) 56 . 02 ( 5 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.15 Profitability group means of debt-asset ratio 
for non - focus firms, 1985-1990 ( in percentages) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 48 . 71 ( 2 ) 43 . 02 ( 31) 54.35 ( 2 9 ) 60.29 ( 7) 
1986 66 . 91 ( 4 ) 41 . 49 ( 3 2 ) 46.12 (15) 83.51 (2 ) 
1987 51.18 ( 9) 33 . 73 ( 2 8) a ( 1) 0 ( 0) 
1988 48.74 (4 ) 40.58 (2 3) 45 . 49 (2 ) a ( 1 ) 
1989 42.29 ( 2 ) 39.31 (13 ) 51.86 (7) a ( 1 ) 
1990 a (1 ) 34.31 ( 6) 61.26 ( 6) 35.69 ( 2 ) 
a) Omi tted to prevent disclosure. 
return on owner's investment. It was possible that these 
firms could have shown improved ROE had they employed more 
debt, especially during the industry's better years. And 
although Group III focus firms generally had levels of debt 
that were more in line with Group I firms, the interest on 
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that debt had enough of a negative influence on their earnings 
to drive their ROE below zero. 
Profitability group means were calculated for each of the 
eight financial variables examined in this study . Sales means 
of the four profitability groups for focus and non-focus firms 
are presented in Tables 4.16 and 4.17. 
The sales mean figures in the tables are given in 
thousands of dollars. The number in parentheses after each 
mean shows the number of firms classified in a particular 
profitability group for that year. These numbers summed 
across the four groups in a given year equaled that year's 
data set size. Several conventions were adopted for these 
tables and all subsequent tables summarize labels for 
profitability group financial variable and ratio means. There 
is no change in the numbers in parentheses among the tables 
except in the table for term debt where means where calculated 
only for the cooperatives that reported term debt. 
The Group I focus firms were comprised mostly of the 
larger cooperatives as measured by the sales means. Their 
sales mean was the highest in years with the lowest number of 
firms represented by that group. As the industry's overall 
performance improved in the middle years of the study and more 
firms were classified as Group I cooperatives, their sale's 
mean declined, but then increased again as fewer firms were 
represented in Group I. The percentage of focus firms 
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Table 4.16 Profitability group sales means of focus firms 
in thousands of dollars (number of firms) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 19,812 (15) 9,698 ( 8 8 ) 9,257 ( 41 ) 8,317 ( 6) 
1986 14,617 ( 34) 7,528 (93) 7 , 744 (22) 0 ( 0) 
1987 13,685 (58) 6,862 ( 8 7) 7,964 (4) 0 ( 0) 
1988 15,320 ( 59 ) 10,846 (85) 9,044 ( 7 ) 0 ( 0) 
1989 19,940 ( 3 8 ) 13,761 ( 82) 12,541 (24 ) 17,371 ( 6) 
1990 21,887 (23 ) 14,283 (9 8 ) 12,055 ( 3 0) a ( 1 ) 
1991 36 ,1 63 { 1 7 ) 13,084 (91) 13,054 ( 3 9) 6,341 { 5 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.17 Profitability group sales means of non-focus 
firms in thousands of dollars (number of firms ) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 7,438 (2 ) 4,997 ( 31 ) 6,216 ( 2 9 ) 3,214 ( 7 ) 
1986 10,790 (4 ) 4,673 ( 3 2 ) 3,927 (15 ) 8,233 ( 2 ) 
1987 8, 00 2 ( 9) 4,245 ( 28 ) a { 1 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 12,631 (4 ) 6,462 (23 ) 4,277 ( 2 ) a ( 1) 
1989 23,546 ( 2 ) 8,189 (13 ) 7,342 ( 7 ) a (1) 
1990 a { 1 ) 8,260 ( 6) 8,259 ( 6) 4,201 { 2) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclo sure. 
classified as Group I cooperatives in a year exceeded non-
focus firm Group I classifications. This result suggested 
that in a less than favorable economic climate, a 
cooperative's scale of operations positively influenced the 
rate of return on owner's equity. 
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The sales means of both Group I and II focus firms 
exceeded that of the non-focus firms in all years but one . 
The exception in 1989 resulted from the small sample size (2 ) 
of Group I non-focus firms . Even within the Group III and IV 
profitability classifications, focus firm's sales means were 
higher than the non-focus firm's means. In view of the fact 
that all of the non-focus firms eventually were reorganized or 
liquidated it may be hypothesized that a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition for a cooperative's long term viability 
is a minimum scale of operations. 
The term debt means by profitability group classification 
are presented in tables 4 . 18 and 4.1 9. Cooperatives that 
reported no term debt in a year were omitted from the means 
calculation. The numbers in parentheses represented the firms 
that reported term debt in the year. 
The percentage of firms within a group that reported term 
debt in a year was highest among Group III and Group IV 
classifications for both data sets (see numbers in parentheses 
in Tables 4 . 16 and 4 . 17) . These two groups tended to have 
relatively high term debt means in most years . 
Group II firms generally had the lowest mean for term 
debt among the four profitability classifications in the data 
sets . The group also had, as a percentage of firms in the 
group, the fewest firms that reported term debt in most years. 
During periods of higher margins (1986-1988) Group II focus 
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Table 4.18 Profitability group term debt means of focus 
firms in thousands of dollars (number of firms) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 397 (12) 552 (8 3 ) 608 ( 3 9) 416 (26) 
1986 508 (32) 395 ( 8 0) 457 ( 2 0) 0 ( 0) 
1987 490 ( 48 ) 297 (66) 463 (4) 0 ( 0) 
1988 476 (50 ) 278 ( 61) 521 ( 6) 0 ( 0) 
1989 398 (2 6 ) 310 (57) 410 ( 2 0) 443 ( 5) 
1990 486 (16) 318 ( 69) 623 (23) a ( 1) 
1991 768 (12) 348 (64) 620 ( 3 3) 498 ( 3) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.19 Profitability group term debt means of non-
focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 547 ( 2) 343 ( 21) 374 ( 2 9) 118 ( 5) 
1986 880 ( 4) 270 ( 2 7 ) 246 (11) a ( 1) 
1987 341 ( 9) 238 ( 2 0) a (1) 0 ( 0) 
1988 157 ( 2) 198 (19) 163 (2) a ( 1) 
1989 a ( l) 105 (10) 237 ( 5) a ( 1) 
1990 0 ( 0) 93 ( 3) 277 ( 6) a ( 1) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
firms , on average , reduced their long term debt. But as 
margins declined, these firms supplemented their lower 
earnings with higher levels of term debt. 
Group I and Group II non-focus firms, with one exception 
in 1986, reduced their long-term borrowing through the end of 
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the period. It may have been that these firms, due to pending 
financial difficulties, had less access to long-term funds 
than their focus firm counterparts. 
A relatively high percentage of Group I focus firms 
employed term debt. These firms increased their level of 
borrowing long-term funds during some of the most profitable 
years (1986-1988) for the industry. In the face of declining 
margins in 1990 and 1991, the fewer but larger firms 
classified as Group I had an increased term debt mean. Larger 
firms would naturally be expected to employ greater levels of 
term debt, but the substantial increase in this mean in 1991 
indicated greater debt levels of the firms that borrowed. 
The local and fixed assets of the focus firms are 
displayed in Tables 4 . 20 and 4.21. These two asset categories 
are presented and discussed together by data set in order to 
better identify and analyze the asset mix of firms in the 
different profitability groups. 
The local and fixed asset means of Group I firms were the 
highest of the profitability groups in all years of the study . 
In asset size , the mean's ranking followed an order of Group 
II, Group III, and Group IV firms. The only exception to this 
pattern was in 1989 when the two asset categories' mean for 
Gr oup IV firms ranked third . This mean's ranking was raised 
due to larger cooperatives classified as Group IV in that 
year. 
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Table 4.20 Profitability group l ocal asset means o f 
f ocus fi r ms in thousands o f dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Gro up IV 
1985 4,83 1 (15 ) 3, 00 3 ( 88 ) 2, 55 7 ( 41 ) 2,482 ( 6 ) 
1986 4,027 (34) 2,615 (93) 2,236 (22) 0 ( 0) 
1987 4,375 ( 58 ) 2,528 ( 87) 2,4 04 (4 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 5,174 ( 59 ) 3 ,358 (85 ) 2, 6 71 ( 7 ) 0 ( 0) 
1989 5,337 ( 38 ) 3, 743 ( 8 2 ) 3, 020 (24 ) 5, 2 12 ( 6 ) 
1990 6 ,408 (23 ) 4,280 ( 9 8 ) 3, 6 2 0 ( 3 0) a ( 1 ) 
1991 10,715 (17 ) 4,340 ( 91) 4,300 ( 3 9) 2,7 0 7 ( 5 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.21 Profitability group fixed asset means o f 
focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 1,425 (15 ) 1,412 ( 88 ) 1,214 ( 41 ) 1, 00 6 ( 6 ) 
1986 1,631 ( 34 ) 1,377 (93 ) 9 6 0 ( 22 ) 0 ( 0) 
1987 1,754 (58 ) 1,239 ( 8 7 ) 9 54 (4 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 1,770 (59 ) 1,319 ( 8 5) 803 ( 7 ) 0 ( 0 ) 
1989 1,881 ( 3 8 ) 1 , 466 ( 82) 1,236 (24) 1,421 ( 6 ) 
1990 2,153 ( 23) 1,642 (98 ) 1,232 ( 3 0 ) a ( 1 ) 
1991 3 ,318 (17 ) 1,672 ( 91 ) 1,464 ( 3 9 ) 66 3 ( 5 ) 
a} Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Of interest in these tables was the proportion or ratio 
o f fixed assets to local assets . For Group I firms, this 
proportion ranged between thirty and forty percent in all o f 
t he sample years. Fo r Group II firms, the propo rtion ranged 
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from approximately thirty-nine to over f i fty percent. Thirty 
to fifty percent of Group III's total assets were fixed 
assets. And twenty-five to forty percent of Group IV's total 
assets were fixed . When compared to similar proportion of 
fixed assets to total assets in the non-focus firm data set, 
the usefulness of the ratio became apparent. 
The local and fixed asset means, by profitability group, 
fo r non- focus firms are presented in Tables 4.22 and 4.23. 
Group I firms had the highest means for the t wo assets 
categories . There was, however , no specific ordering in the 
level of asset means, by profitability group, in the data set. 
The non- focus firm's asset means were lower in all 
profitability group categories than were the focus firm's 
means. 
The range in the proportion of fixed assets to local 
assets was greater among more o f the profitability groups of 
non-focus firms than of focus firms. The proportion for non-
focus Group I firms ranged from twenty-seven to fifty-five 
percent . The ratio of Group II non - focus firms paralleled 
Group II focus firms i.e . between thirty- nine and fifty 
percent . The proportion of Group III firm's fixed asset to 
local assets was between thirty-two and forty-nine percent. 
And the proportion's range for Group IV firms was thirty-eight 
to nearly fifty percent. The variation in the range of this 
r at io between focus and non-focus Group I firms demonstrated 
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Table 4 . 22 Profitability group local asset means of non-
focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 2,135 ( 2) 1,628 ( 31) 1,821 ( 29) 1,000 ( 7) 
1986 3 , 142 ( 4) 1,695 ( 3 2) 1,287 (15) 1 , 847 (2) 
1987 2,416 ( 9) 1,647 ( 2 8 ) a ( 1) 0 ( 0) 
1988 3,996 (4) 2,123 (23) 1,489 ( 2) a ( 1) 
1989 5,612 ( 2) 1,828 (13) 2,296 ( 7) a ( 1) 
1990 a ( 1) 1,668 ( 6) 2,851 ( 6) 1 , 422 (2) 
a) Omi tted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4. 23 Profitability group fixed asset means of non-
focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 960 ( 2) 701 (3 1 ) 959 ( 2 9) 375 ( 7) 
1986 1,780 (4 ) 81 4 (32) 628 (15) 737 ( 2) 
1987 972 ( 9) 803 ( 28) a ( 1) 0 ( 0) 
1988 1,144 (4) 90 1 ( 2 3) 486 ( 2) a ( 1) 
1989 1 , 567 ( 2) 749 (13) 810 ( 7) a ( 1) 
1990 a ( 1) 644 ( 6) 1,035 (6) 578 (2) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure . 
that the most profitable firms, Group I focus firms, had a 
more consistent asset mix in their operations . 
The profitability group local equity means for focus and 
non-focus firms are presented in Tables 4.24 and 4.25. The 
focus firm's equity base, as measured by its profitability 
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Table 4.24 Profitability group local equity means of focus 
firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 2,238 (15 ) 1,699 ( 88 ) 1, 067 ( 41 ) 733 ( 6 ) 
1986 1,848 (3 4 ) 1,662 (93) 950 (22) 0 ( 0) 
1987 2,035 (58) 1,672 ( 8 7) 1,042 ( 4 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 2,242 ( 59 ) 1,849 ( 85 ) 815 ( 7 ) 0 ( 0) 
1989 2,635 ( 38 ) 2 , 03 1 (82 ) 1,334 (24 ) 1, 090 ( 6 ) 
1990 2,917 (23 ) 2,247 ( 9 8 ) 1,194 ( 3 0) a ( 1 ) 
1991 4,199 (17 ) 2,276 (91) 1 ,4 01 ( 3 9) 569 ( 5 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.25 Profitability group local equity means of non-
focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 817 (2) 849 ( 31) 798 ( 2 9 ) 288 ( 7 ) 
1986 1,152 (4 ) 970 ( 3 2 ) 676 (15 ) 135 (2 ) 
1987 1,090 ( 9 ) 1,021 ( 2 8 ) a ( 1 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 2 , 0 47 ( 4 ) 1,099 (23 ) 522 ( 2) a ( 1 ) 
1989 3 ,397 ( 2) 1, 02 4 (13) 865 ( 7) a ( 1 ) 
1990 a ( 1 ) 981 ( 6) 1,021 ( 6 ) 752 (2) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
group means, exceeded that of the non - focus firms for nearly 
all observations. The exceptions were based on a small sample 
of non-focus Group I firms in 1989 and 1990 . The local equity 
means of some focus firm group classifications doubled the 
mean of non-focus firm classifications in many years, 
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especially among the Group II firms. 
Group I and II focus firms had relatively strong equity 
positions throughout the study. These group's means stayed 
fairly consistent early during the period (1985-1987) then 
increased by ninety and thirty-three percent, respectively, of 
their 1985 levels by the end of the period . Group III and 
IV 's equity positions, while stronger than their counterparts 
among non-focus firms, were for most years substantially 
weaker than the first two profitability groups. This was true 
of other measures for scale such as sales and asset levels. 
These measures also revealed that smaller firms, based on 
their profitability group classification, generally realized 
lower returns on their owner's investments . 
With the exception of their Group I cooperatives in 1988 
to 1990, the non-focus firm's equity positions, as measured by 
each group's local equity mean, was substantially lower than 
their focus firm counterparts. This was especially true for 
the Group III and IV non-focus firms. Although the firms in 
these groups operated on smaller scales, it appeared that they 
were under-financed with equity capital. It is likely that 
equity had been eroding due to operating losses and reached a 
critical point. This situation could be crippling to a 
cooperative during times of unfavorable economic conditions . 
Tables 4.26 and 4.27 present the profitability group net 
local margins means . Both focus and non-focus Group I firms 
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Tabl e 4.26 Net margin means of focus firms by CROA 
profitability group in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 349 (15) 111 (88) -139 (41 ) - 4 32 ( 6) 
1986 400 ( 3 4 ) 179 (93) -98 (22) 0 ( 0) 
1987 506 ( 58 ) 230 ( 8 7) -98 ( 4 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 497 ( 59 ) 213 ( 8 5 ) -49 ( 7) 0 ( 0) 
1989 530 ( 3 8 ) 178 (82 ) -139 (24 ) -593 ( 6 ) 
1990 530 (23) 199 (98) -92 ( 3 0) a ( 1) 
1991 661 (17 ) 164 (9 1 ) -108 ( 3 9) -263 ( 5 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.27 Net margin means of non-focus firms by CROA 
profitability group in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 210 ( 2) 63 ( 31) -93 ( 2 9) -146 ( 7) 
1986 394 ( 4 ) 93 (32) - 4 0 (15) - 412 (2) 
1987 274 ( 9) 112 ( 28) a (1) 0 ( 0) 
1988 410 (4 ) 109 ( 2 3) -73 ( 2 ) a ( 1) 
1989 681 ( 2) 61 (13 ) -91 ( 7) a ( 1) 
1990 a (1) 99 (6) -109 ( 6) - 141 ( 2) 
a ) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
had margin levels up to four times those calculated f or their 
respective data set's Group II firms. The high margin means 
o f these Group I firm's were realized even in the years when 
the industry averages were quite low (i .e. 1985 and 1991 ) . 
The ability of these focus Group I firms to consistently 
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outperform the industry average, indicated superior rates of 
return to their owner's investment unmatched by the other 
cooperatives in the sample. 
The Group II focus firms outperformed the industry 
average in years when industry margins were low, but had lower 
margin levels in years when the industry average was higher 
(see Table 4.2). These firm's margins were consistently twice 
the size of their non-focus firm counterparts, who in all 
years of the study had mean margin levels below the industry 
average. 
By definition of the model of cooperative profitability, 
all Group III and Group IV firms had negative local margins. 
For b o th focus and non -focus Group III firms the losses, as 
measured by the margin's mean, were lessened during periods o f 
brisk economic activity, i.e. 1986-1989. On the other hand, 
Group IV firms in both data sets posted substantial losses 
across the entire period. 
The interest means by profitability group for the focus 
and non-focus firm data sets are summarized in Tables 4.28 and 
4.29. Although not all firms carried term debt, nearly all 
cooperatives (numbers shown in parentheses ) comprising the 
samples had interest expense over the period. All of the non-
focus firms had interest expense and essentially all of the 
Groups I, III, and IV focus firms had this expense. Group II 
focus firms had the greatest number of firms with no interest 
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Table 4. 28 Profitability group means f o r interest expense 
of f ocus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 135 (15} 111 (88) 147 (41} 176 ( 6) 
1986 116 (3 4 } 70 (91) 129 ( 21} 0 ( 0} 
1987 85 (58) 47 ( 81) 103 ( 4) 0 ( 0) 
1988 108 ( 58 } 71 (82} 103 ( 7} 0 ( 0) 
1989 105 ( 3 7 } 106 (7 8} 127 (24) 247 ( 6 } 
1990 122 (22) 106 ( 9 5 ) 140 (30) a ( 1) 
1991 205 (16} 86 (8 6 ) 131 ( 3 9) 76 (5) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.2 9 Profitability group means of interest expense 
for non-focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 53 ( 2) 67 ( 31) 117 ( 2 9) 53 ( 7) 
1986 160 (4) 57 (32) 59 (15) 197 (2) 
1987 67 ( 9) 41 ( 2 8) a ( 1) 0 ( 0) 
1988 69 ( 4) 59 ( 2 2} 47 (2) a ( 1) 
1989 2 68 ( 2) 50 (13) 96 ( 7) a ( 1) 
1990 a ( 1) 51 ( 6) 105 ( 6) 45 ( 2} 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
payments . 
The interest means of focus firms for all profitability 
group classifications were generally higher than non - focus 
firm's means. This result was not surprising given the higher 
levels of debt (both current and term) carried by the focus 
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firms. The reduction of term debt, without substantial 
increases in current debt, by the majority of non-focus firms 
in the latter years of the study also contributed to this 
finding . 
Although Group I focus firms had on average high interest 
payments, this expense was not sufficient to raise the cash 
flow rate of return on assets above the rate of return on 
o wner's equity. This group's interest mean reflected its 
employment of increased levels o f term debt as economic 
conditions improved and borrowing costs diminished. In 
addition the increased use of short-term debt financing, with 
its shorter terms and lower borrowing costs helped keep their 
interest payments from reducing ROE below their CROA . 
The focus and non-focus firm's depreciation expense means 
are presented in Tables 4 . 30 and 4.31. The total value of 
focus firm's depreciatio n expense mean exceeded that of the 
non-focus firm's mean across all profitability group 
classificat i o ns consistently throughout the period of the 
study. The larger level of fixed assets employed by focus 
firms in the four groups accounted for this finding. The 
primary difference between the t wo data sets and within group 
classifications was found in the depreciation rate that can be 
derived from ratio of the depreciation expense mean t o the 
fixed asset mean (demonstrated in long-run profitability group 
analysis) . 
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Table 4.30 Profitability group depreciation expense means 
for focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 186 ( 15 ) 182 ( 88) 176 (41 ) 136 ( 6) 
1986 213 ( 34) 174 (93) 155 (22) 0 ( 0) 
1987 224 (58) 163 ( 8 7) 226 ( 4) 0 ( 0) 
1988 211 ( 59 ) 186 ( 85) 150 ( 7) 0 ( 0) 
1989 223 (38) 194 (82) 183 ( 24) 238 ( 6) 
1990 259 (23) 211 (98) 166 ( 3 0) a ( 1) 
1991 419 (17) 208 ( 91) 197 ( 3 9) 101 ( 5) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table 4.31 Profitability group depreciation expense means 
for non-focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 90 (2) 83 ( 31) 119 ( 29 ) 40 ( 7) 
1986 143 ( 4) 103 (32) 87 (15) 144 ( 2 ) 
1987 108 ( 9) 96 (28) a ( 1 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 125 (4) 107 (23) 75 ( 2) a ( 1) 
1989 189 ( 2) 93 (13) 118 ( 7) a ( 1) 
1990 a ( 1) 101 (6) 131 ( 6) 66 ( 2) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Group I non-focus firms depreciated fixed assets at a 
rate that approached , in some years, five percentage points 
under the rate of their focus firm counterparts . Group I 
focus firms, on average, depreciated fixed assets at a rate 
that varied between 11 . 8 and 13 percent which was 
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approximately the sample firm's depreciation mean in most 
years of the study. The lower depreciation mean found among 
the Group I non-focus firms indicated a slower replacement 
rate of these firms fixed assets. 
Group III and IV firms of both data sets depreciated 
fixed assets at higher rates than did Groups I and II in most 
years of the study, with the exception of the Group IV non-
focus firms in 1989 and 1990. Group III's 1987 depreciation 
means for both groups were above t wenty percent of their 
respective fixed asset's mean. And during the industry's most 
profitable years, Group III focus firm's depreciation mean 
exceeded fifteen percent of fixed assets. 
3. Long-run profitability group classifications a.nd 
variable profiles 
As previously described in section B.3 of Chapter III, a 
long- run profitability group classification analysis was done 
on the focus firm data set. Financial variable and ratio 
means and standard deviations were calculated for the three 
profitability groups that were represented in the analysis as 
well as for the complete data set. The long-run analysis, 
using the CROA criteria, produced no Group IV cooperative 
classifications. Any such firms would have had, on average, 
negative earnings in all the sample years with negative 
measures of CROA and ROE. It was highly unlikely that a 
cooperative could remain viable under these conditions. 
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Table 4.32 presents the first o f three tables summarizing 
the results of the l o ng-run analysis. The financial variable 
means are presented in thousands of do llars. The focus firm 
means provided a standard measure of firm performance over the 
seven year period. The results can be interpreted as yearly 
averages for financial statement variables and financial 
ratios of a representative cooperative in the data set . 
Likewise , the profitability group means represented yearl y 
averages over the period for a c ooperative's particular 
classification. Group means that differed significantly among 
the profitability group classifications are identified next to 
the group's variable mean. The Scheffe procedure was used to 
make comparisons among the group means. The group number in 
parentheses indicates the profitability group comparisons that 
had significant differences in their variable (and ratio ) 
means . 
Over seventy-five percent of the focus firms had 
profitability Group II long-run classifications. Of the three 
long-run profitability groups Group II firms had, based on 
yearly sales, local and total asset means, the smallest scale 
of operations . Yearly average sales of these firms over the 
period ranged from just over $1 . 13 million to $50 million. 
This long-run group's firms employed higher levels of local 
equity and fixed assets than Group III firms, who based on 
sales, local and total asset means had larger scale of 
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Table 4.32 Long-run CROA profitability group classification 
financial variable means in percentages 
(std. dev . ) a 
Cate9o ry Sam:ele Grou:e I Grou:e II Grou:e III 
N 150 21 114 15 
Sales 12,494 25,811( 2 , 3 ) 10,018 12 ,668 
(15,089 ) (33 ,236 ) (7 ,5 08) (8 , 612 ) 
Term 321 596( 2 ) 247 (3 ) 493 
Debt (463 ) (842 ) ( 331 ) ( 444 ) 
Local 1,907 3,261( 2 , 3 ) 1,747 1 ,234 
Equity (1 ,859 ) (3 ,826) (1, 216) ( 698 ) 
Total 4,659 9 , 045 (2 , 3 ) 3 ,822 4,878 
Assets (4,918 ) (10,458) (2 , 706) (2, 730) 
Local 3,816 7 866( 2 , 3 ) I 3,102 3,568 
Assets (4,312 ) (9 ,223) (2 ,3 05) (2 , 153 ) 
Fixed 1,505 2,689( 2 , 3 ) 1 ,326 1 ,2 09 
Assets (1,634 ) (3 , 316) (1,095 ) ( 761 ) 
a) Parentheses indicate group means signifi c antly 
different at a 95% confidence level. 
operations . 
Lo ng-run profitability Group I firms were comprised 
largely of the biggest firms in the sample. Their size, based 
o n yearly sales average, ranged from $6.6 million to over $57 
million . Based on sales and asset means, Group I firms were 
on average twice to two-and-a-half times l arger than firms in 
either of the other two profitability gro up classifications. 
The remaining long-run profitability group financial 
v ariable means are presented in Table 4.33. The means 
included income and flow of funds statement variables. 
Gr oup I cooperatives were clearly t he most profitable 
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Table 4.33 Long-run CROA profitability group classification 
financial variable means in percentages 
Category 
N 
Margins 
Interest 
Deprec -
iation 
Term 
Loans 
Cash 
Refunds 
Equity 
Retired 
(std. dev. ) a 
Sample 
150 
200 
( 3 24 ) 
97 
( 13 2 ) 
197 
(206 ) 
77 
(144) 
55 
(97 ) 
69 
(102 ) 
Group I 
21 
561( 2 , 3 ) 
( 607) 
192 (2 ) 
(264 ) 
350 (2 , 3 ) 
( 440 ) 
202( 2 ) 
( 331) 
167( 2 , 3 ) 
(205 ) 
130( 2 , 3 ) 
( 191 ) 
Gro up II 
114 
171 (3 ) 
(191 ) 
73 
( 8 0 ) 
167 
(124 ) 
49 
( 5 8 ) 
4 0 
( 4 6 ) 
63 
( 7 9 ) 
Gro up III 
15 
-86 
(76 ) 
15 0 
(111 ) 
20 5 
(1 0 5 ) 
116 
( 67 ) 
14 
(11 ) 
28 
(25 ) 
Fx.Asset 232 540 (2 , 3 ) 178 205 
Purchase (313) (704) (139) (99) 
a ) Parentheses indicate group means significantly 
different at a 95% confidence level. 
o f the three groups. Group I's net local margins (margins ) 
were over three times greater than Group II's margin mean. 
The fif t een Group III cooperatives, o n average, posted yearly 
losses throughout the period. 
While Group I's margin mean was over three times Gro up 
II's mean, the Group I firms had cash refunds over four times 
the amount o f Group II indicating a higher average percentage 
o f yearly cash patro nage. High cash refunds serve as a 
positive i n c entive f o r member participat ion in the 
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cooperative. Group III firms made some cash refunds, but 
these were paid out of their income from investments in other 
cooperatives, not their l ocal margins . In many cases they 
come from not reinvesting depreciation cash flow rather than 
current income. 
Group I had the highest interest and deprecia tion expense 
means as well as mean term loans of the three profitability 
groups . This result is not surprising considering the size 
differences between Group I and the t wo other groups. 
However, the interest expense mean for Group I firms relative 
to the debt they employed indicated a lower cost of debt when 
compared Group's II and III. As will be seen later this is in 
part due to a greater reliance on short-term debt. Group I 
firms use larger amounts of term debt on an annual basis but 
it is a smaller fracti on of their total debt . 
Group I firms retired twice the amount of equity anual ly 
as Group II firms and nearly five times the amount of Group 
III firms . In view of the relative equity positions of the 
three Groups, this indicated that Group I firms had a shorter 
equity revolvement period than did the firms in the other two 
groups. Also, Group I firms purchased new fixed assets at a 
yearly rate of t wo-and-a- half to three times the rate for 
Groups II or III. 
The financial ratio means calculated for the long-run 
profitability group classifications are presented in 
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Table 4.34 Long-run CROA profitability group classification 
financial ratio means in p ercentages (std. dev. ) a 
Category 
N 
CROA 
ROE 
D/ A 
Term 
/ TotDbt. 
Interest 
/ TotDbt . 
Depree . 
/ FAssets 
FAsset 
/ TotAst. 
LAsset 
/ TotAst. 
Retired 
/ LEquity 
Sample 
150 
13 . 39 
(4 . 06) 
8.54 
( 8. 57 ) 
43.78 
(17.06 ) 
18.05 
(11.87 ) 
5.48 
(2.75 ) 
14.59 
(4.26 ) 
31.63 
(8.99 ) 
79.65 
(7. 37) 
3 . 00 
( l.91) 
Group I 
21 
16 . 10 (3 ) 
(4.03) 
19.37 (2 , 3 ) 
( 5. 88 ) 
54.97 (2 ) 
(12 .8 0) 
14 . 87 
(10. 42 ) 
4.19( 3 ) 
(l. 68 ) 
14.71 (3 ) 
(4. 40 ) 
27.68 (3 ) 
(9.17) 
84 . 19( 3 ) 
(6 . 92) 
3.56 
( 2 . 13 ) 
Group II 
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13.57 (3 ) 
(3.64) 
8.77 (3 ) 
(4. 73) 
39 .43 (3 ) 
(15.21) 
18.17 
(12.16) 
5.53 
( 2 . 93) 
14.08( 3 ) 
(3.98 ) 
33.16 (3 ) 
(8 .63) 
79.76( 3 ) 
(6.90) 
3 . 00 
(1.91 ) 
Group III 
15 
8 . 26 
(2 . 27) 
-8.38 
(8.25 ) 
61.18 
(1 8.21 ) 
21.59 
(11.08 ) 
6.93 
(l.48 ) 
18.29 
(4. 58) 
25. 55 
(7 .53 ) 
72 . 48 
( 6. 25 ) 
2 . 27 
(1 . 30 ) 
FAPurch 115.55 151.07 (2 , 3 ) 110.44 104.61 
/ Depree. (39.09) (42.59) (3 6.93) (20.86) 
a) Parenthes es indicate group means significantly 
different at a 95% confidence level . 
Table 4.34 . The long- run analysis calculated similar ratios 
used in previous profitability group analysis as well as 
additional ratios constructed from financial variables. It 
was believed that these additional ratios could provide 
valuable information on cooperatives' asset and flow o f funds 
structure. 
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The profitability group means for the three financial 
ratios that were calculated for the study were considerably 
different among Groups I, II, and III cooperatives. The CROA 
measures for Group I and II firms were both relatively high, 
and Group I had nearly twice the CROA mean as Group III firms . 
Group I's average return on owner 's investment was twice the 
magnitude of Group II's whi le, due to a negative yearly 
average for net local margins, Group III 's ROE was negative 
throughout the period. 
The debt-asset mean of the groups diverged considerably 
as well. Group II firms employed the lowest percentage of 
debt with over sixty percent of their local assets equity 
funded. Group III firms had a muc h higher D/A ratio , funding 
local assets with less than thirty-nine percent of equity. 
And Group I's local assets were funded with nearly forty - five 
percent local equity. 
The degree cooperatives depended on long-term funds was 
captured in the term debt to total debt ratio. Of the three 
profitability groups, Group I firms employed the least amount 
of term debt and Group III firms the most . The extent to 
which a cooperative employs term-debt is fundamental to its 
cost of debt capital. Firms that employed high levels of term 
debt generally had higher interest expenses. 
The long-run profitability group analysis also produced 
differences in financial statement variables and ratios among 
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the three profitability groups. In addition to differences in 
scale the relationships between the financial variable and 
ratio means allowed further discrimination in firm 
characteristics among the groups . Several other Group I 
financial characteristics separ ated this profitability group 
from the others. 
As shown in Table 4.33 Group I were the most profitable 
of all focus firms. Their local net margins were nearly four 
time s those of Group II . Group III firms, on average, had 
nega tive net local margins. Any earnings these firms realized 
were in the form of patronage refunds from investments in 
h > • ot er cooperatives. Over twenty-seven percent of these firm's 
total assets were investments i n other cooper atives, whereas 
Group I firms had less than sixteen percent of their total 
assets as equity in other cooperatives and Group II firms had 
a little over twenty percent of their total assets invested as 
such . 
Although Group I had the highest interest expense mean, 
it accounted for just a little over four-percent of these 
firm's total debt. Their term debt to total debt ratio of 
14.87 percent indicated that these firms depended on short-
term borrowing to a much greater degree than the firms in 
other groups. The lower borrowing costs of these funds were 
partly responsible for Group I's relatively low interest 
expense mean and low interest expense to total debt ratio. 
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Group III firms, on the other hand, incurred higher borrowing 
costs as a result of their greater dependence on long-term 
debt and possibly adverse interest rate classifications by the 
lender. 
The depreciation rate of Group I firms, measured by 
depreciation expense to fixed assets, was nearly fifteen 
percent per year. Group II firms depreciated fixed assets at 
a slightly lesser rate of fourteen-percent per year while 
Group III's rate was over eighteen-percent per year. Not 
replacing fixed assets over the period may have accounted for 
Group III's higher average depreciation rate. 
Group I had the highest percentage of total assets in the 
form of locally controlled assets while Group III had the 
lowest. As a percentage of total assets, Groups I and III's 
fixed assets were approximately the same. Group II had a 
higher percentage of their total assets as fixed assets . 
Of the three profitability groups Group I firms retired 
the highest percentage of local equity per year. The $130,000 
of equity the average Group I firm retired each year 
represented over three-and-a-half percent of its local equity, 
which translated into an estimated revolvement period of 
approximately t wenty-eight years. Based on the percent o f 
local equity retired each year, Group II's revolvement period 
was estimated to be nearly thirty-three years and Group III's 
was estimated to be over forty-four years in length. The 
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Group I firms , however, had the capaci t y to increase this rate 
without taking cash flow f r om fixed asset replacement. 
One of the most dis c riminating differences between the 
profitability groups was found in the mean for fixed assets 
purchased. Clearly Group I's purchases exceeded the other 
Groups in dollar a mounts (Table 4.33 ) but what is really of 
interest here is the percentage of fixed assets purchased to 
the Group's depreciation expense mean. Group I firms were not 
only replacing their depreciated assets but were also, on 
average, expanding their fixed asset base by fifty- o ne percent 
of the depreciation expense each year. While the decision was 
made to expand, these cooperatives c ould have elected to 
retire equity at a faster pace and still maintained their 
fixed asset base . The fixed assets purc hased by the other two 
groups were j ust sufficient to replac e their depreciated 
assets. Faster equity retirement would require a reduction in 
fixed asset base. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Discussion of Research Results 
A chief objective of this study was to measure the 
performance of local grain marketing and input supply 
cooperatives . The main interest behind measuring cooperative 
performance was to isolate and identify firms that 
consistently outperformed industry averages for the sample. 
The relationship between cooperative capital structure and 
firm profitability was used as an approach to performance 
measurement. A model of cooperative profitability was applied 
to the sample to classify firms based on their rate of return 
on assets and owner's investment. Although owners do not 
receive direct payments based on investment as corporate 
investors, the benefits of the cooperative to members hinge on 
effective use of equity. From the model, cooperative 
performance groups were separated and financial variable and 
ratio means were calculated for the groups. The following 
summarizes the resul ts of the study and comments on its 
implications for cooperative growth . 
Ove r the peri od of the study the sample si z e decreased 
from 219 cooperatives in 1985 to 152 in 1991, a loss of 69 
firms. A result of these losses was that by 1991 the average 
cooperative had grown considerably. Average sales were up 
over seventy-five percent from 1985 . Local assets had 
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increased by ninety percent and fixed assets increased by 
sixty percent. By 1 991, the average equity capital employed 
by the sample firms had inc reased seventy percent. 
Although the average sample cooperative had greatly 
increased its size and scale of operations over the period, in 
1991 it employed only a slightly higher level of l o ng-term 
debt than in 1985 . And its debt-asset ratio was actually a 
percent-and- a-quarter l ower in 1991 than in 1985. Cle arly, a 
larger portion of cooperative 's operations involved greater 
inventory hedging that was short-term financed. 
Because the focus firms were essentially the same 
throughout the perio d and on average larger than sample firms, 
the group's financial variable means captured some of the 
strengths in the financial statements of solvent cooperatives. 
These firms, on average, realized nearly a fifty percent 
increase in sales over the period. Local assets of the firms 
increased by over sixty-five percent while fixed assets 
increased by thirty-three percent. Although focus firms had 
improved their equity position by nearly fifty percent by the 
end of the study, debt still accounted for over forty-seven 
percent of capital financing. And short-term debt represented 
a larger proportion of this debt than in 1985. 
Of the firms that eventually discontinued operations, 
profitability appeared to be the non-focus firms major 
problem. During the most profitable years in the study, these 
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firms net local margins were still substantially below the 
sample's average . Low margins coupled with relatively high 
debt costs were sufficient to eventually force these firms out 
of business . In the earlier years of the study, the smaller 
non-focus firms were initially the first to discontinue 
operations . Improved margins and interest expense allowed 
many of the larger non-focus firms to continue operating in 
1987 and 1988. The but then as margins declined and interest 
costs rose in 1989 and 1990, even these firms were eventually 
driven out of the industry. 
The profitability group analysis of the firms who stayed 
solvent (focus firms) and those who dropped out of the sample 
(non-focus firms) provided insight into firm characteristics 
of the more successful cooperatives. In particular, the 
annual means of Group I focus firms demonstrated superior 
rates of return on o wner's investment. By definition, Group I 
firms had measures of ROE that exceeded their CROA measure . 
Even though their CROA measures were respectable in all years 
of the study, these firms posted very impressive measures of 
ROE, much higher than the sample's average. 
Group I focus firms consistent ly had debt-asset ratios 
exceeding fifty percent. Although a relatively high 
percentage of that debt was in long-term obl igations early in 
the period, it still had an enhancing effect on the return on 
owner's investment . And as these firms employed more short-
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term debt to replace long-term debt later in the period, they 
continued to post very respectable ROEs . 
The most obvious characteristic of the Group I firms was 
their size as measured by sales, local and fixed assets and 
equity means. In all years of the study, Group I firms were 
one-and-a-half to two times as large as the size of an average 
sample firm for these categories. In 1991, Group I firms 
doubled the sample's average for all the size categories. 
Given the fairly consistent mix of fixed and local asse t s , 
especially in the last four years, the apparent scale of 
operation advantages these firms possessed provided high 
returns on equity and growth opportunity . 
Another characteristic of Group I firms was their ability 
to generate high margins. Clearly the firms were the most 
profitable out of the sample. Their local net margin mean far 
surpassed the sample's average over the period. This was not 
unexpected considering that l arger cooperative ' s generally 
comprised the group. However, in years that were not 
necessarily favorable for the industry as a whole (1985, 1990, 
and 1991) , the firms classified in Group I remained quite 
profi t able. This seems to indicate that they were effective 
competitors in adverse periods as well as better periods . 
Though all Group I firms employed some level of debt 
(over seventy percent carried term debt) throughout the study, 
their interest costs on this debt was not a significant enough 
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burden to negatively affect the rate of return on owner's 
equity. It is likely that their scale of operations and 
performance record positioned them to negotiate more favorable 
lending terms than other sample firms . Employing relatively 
more short-term rather than long-term debt also gave the firms 
a debt cost advantage over firms who depended more heavily on 
term-debt financing. This fact was highlighted by long-run 
Group I firm's interest expense to debt ratio. 
The long-run profitability group analysis revealed 
several discriminating firm characteristics of the t wenty 
firms who were classified in Group I over the entire period. 
Long-run Group I firm's local assets accounted for more 
than eighty- four percent of their total assets, the highest 
percentage among all the profitability groups. Local assets 
were defined as those assets under the direct control of a 
cooperative's management and members . A high degree of local 
cont rol over a firm's assets provides greater flexibility in 
deciding where and how those assets are employed. Group I 
firm's ability to allocate a larger share of their resources 
(assets) into profitable ventures provided them with greater 
opportuni ties to capture greater profits . 
Group I's cash patronage refunds were on average high 
compared with Group I and II's refunds . High cash refunds can 
serve as an immediate incentive for member-patrons to increase 
their business and investment in a local cooperative. Even 
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with Group I's high cash refunds, equity growth was achieved. 
Equity growth combined with sufficiently good yearly margins 
created the essential preconditions for Group I firms to grow. 
As shown in the focus firm's profitability group tables 
for depreciation expense and fixed asset means, and in the 
long-run table for the same means, Group I firms depreciated 
their fixed assets at a rate of approximately fifteen percent 
a year. Although their fixed asset base was continually 
growing, on average, the fixed assets purchased per year 
exceeded twenty percent of Group I's fixed asset total . In 
other words, the firms not only replaced depreciated assets 
but increased those assets, on average, by nearly fifty-five 
percent ($190,000) of their depreciation expense each year. 
As a percentage, fixed assets constituted close to twenty-
eight percent of Group I firms total assets . This long-run 
ratio was in the range of Group I 's yearly profitability group 
fixed asset to total asset ratio. 
In addition to providing substantial rates of return on 
owner's investment and experiencing organizational growth, the 
long -run Group I firms, on average, were redeeming equity at a 
moderate rate. Their equity revolvement period, estimated to 
be twenty-eight years in length , was the shortest among the 
long - run profitability groups. It appeared, over the seven 
years of the study, that Group I firms opted for a longer 
revolvement period in favor of increased cooperative growth . 
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It would have been possible for these firms to have reduced 
their fixed asset purchases in favor of a shorter revolvement 
period. Nonetheless, these long-run Group I firms were 
rotating equity at an acceptable rate and have the capability 
to increase the rate about double the current rate and still 
replace fixed assets. 
B. Conclusions 
The model of cooperative profitability proved to be 
useful in separating firms that had relatively high debt 
levels but provided respectable rates of return on owner's 
investment from firms whose debt levels negatively affected 
owner ' s rate of return on investment. This discriminating 
ability of the model allowed identification of the financial 
characteristics of cooperatives that provided the greatest 
returns to their owner-members. 
Owner-members generally support their local cooperative 
for reasons other than direct return on equity (e .g. to ensure 
tha t they'll have an outlet for marketing products and 
purchasing farm input supplies ) . But they must also be 
concerned with cooperative's effective use of equity as 
measured by the return on their investment. While financial 
returns are based on patronage the firm must use equity 
capital effectively to provide acceptable patronage refunds 
and revolvement. Ultimately farmer members lose value when 
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their cooperative uses equity capital ineffectively . 
Cooperative Boards of Directors are responsible to members for 
competently maintaining the profitability and the effective 
use of capital to ensure viability o f the organization. 
The results of this study provide useful information to a 
cooperative Board when analyzing financial characteristics of 
its firm. Because the firms represented in the sample were 
grain marketing and supply cooperatives, the study's results 
are most applicable to similar operations . However, the 
approach and model used are more widely applicable. With more 
information on a cooperative's business mix , i.e . percent of 
I 
marketing and supply business, a more detailed profitabil ity 
group analysis would be possible. Then, specific categories 
could be included for firm activity type that would possibly 
improve the discriminating ability of the model and better 
identify financial performance characteristics of profitable 
and growing organizations. 
C . Impl i cations for Cooperative Decisionmakers 
The analysis has numerous implications for cooperative 
decision makers. Three are especially important . 
First, larger cooperative organizations appear to be most 
successful in generating a large enough ROE to be effective in 
maintaining fixed assets while having the c apacity to retire 
equity . Although size does not appear to guarantee success, 
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it was clear that cooperatives with ROE greater than CROA 
tended to be larger. This would imply that there is a benefit 
to reaching some minimal size. It also implies that 
cooperative directors and members should make a conscious 
decision to achieve that size if they wish to retire equity 
while maintaining their fixed asset base. 
Second, a large fraction of cooperatives (over t wo-
thirds ) were capable of reaching the point where ROE was 
greater than ROA but not CROA. These cooperatives will likely 
face a decision of whether to maintain fixed assets or revolve 
retained equity. Unless returns can be increased with assets 
they currently own or the cost of debt can be adjusted to 
increase their return on equity, these firms are unlikely to 
experience any substantial growth and return equity at the 
same time. 
Third the implied promise of equity retirement at a 
specific age may not be met for many cooperative patrons . 
Group II and Group III cooperatives in the long-run analysis 
are likely to find revolving periods getting longer and an 
increasing amount of equity being retired via estates rather 
than through policy. The increasing number of members 
reaching the age of retirement and the smaller number o f 
entering members combined with the low return on equity is 
likely to create stress in these cooperatives as they move 
forward. 
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE FIRMS PROFITABILITY GROUP PROFILES 
Table A.l CROA profitability group sales means of sample 
firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 18,356 (17) 8,473 ( 119 ) 7,997 (70) 5,569 (13 ) 
1986 14,214 ( 38 ) 6,797 ( 125 ) 6,196 ( 3 7 ) 8,233 (2 ) 
1987 12,922 ( 67) 6,225 ( 115 ) 8,036 ( 5) 0 ( 0 ) 
1988 15,149 (63) 9 ,912 ( 108) 7,984 ( 9) a ( 1 ) 
1989 20,120 ( 4 0) 12,998 (9 5 ) 11,367 (31 ) 15,338 ( 7 ) 
1990 23 , 291 (24) 13,935 (104) 11,422 ( 3 6) 5,774 ( 3) 
1 991 36,163 (17) 13,084 ( 91) 13,054 ( 3 9 ) 6,341 ( 5) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table A. 2 CROA profitability group term debt means of 
sample firms in thousands o f dollars (firms 
reporting debt) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 568 (1 4 ) 442 ( 9 9) 482 (68) 267 (11 ) 
1986 550 ( 3 6) 363 (107) 382 ( 31) a ( 1 ) 
1987 466 ( 57) 283 ( 86) 569 (5) 0 ( 0) 
1988 464 (52) 259 (80) 431 ( 8) a ( 1 ) 
1989 386 ( 2 7) 280 ( 6 7) 375 ( 25 ) 418 ( 6) 
1990 486 (16) 308 (72) 552 ( 29 ) 114 (2 ) 
1991 768 (12 ) 348 (6 4) 620 ( 3 3) 498 (3 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
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Table A.3 CROA profitability group local asset means o f 
sample firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 4,514 (17 ) 2,645 ( 119) 3,096 (70) 1,684 (13 ) 
1986 3,933 ( 3 8 ) 2,380 (125 ) 1,851 (3 7 ) 1,847 (2 ) 
1987 4,112 ( 67 ) 2,313 ( 115 ) 2,275 ( 5) 0 ( 0) 
1988 5,099 (63 ) 3,095 ( 108 ) 2,408 ( 9 ) a ( 1 ) 
1989 5,351 ( 4 0 ) 3 ,481 ( 9 5 ) 2,857 ( 31 ) 4,008 ( 7 ) 
1990 6,460 (24 ) 4,129 (104 ) 3,492 ( 3 6) 2, 00 9 ( 3 ) 
1991 10,715 ( 1 7 ) 4,34 0 ( 91 ) 4,300 ( 3 9) 2,707 ( 5 ) 
a ) Omitted to prevent disclosure . 
Table A.4 CROA profitability group fixed asset means of 
sample firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 1,370 (17) 1,227 ( 119 ) 1,108 (70 ) 666 (13 ) 
1986 1,646 ( 3 8 ) 1,233 ( 125 ) 826 ( 3 7) 737 ( 2 ) 
1987 1,649 ( 67 ) 1,133 (115) 908 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 1,730 (63 ) 1,230 (108 ) 733 ( 9 ) a ( 1 ) 
1989 1,865 ( 40) 1,368 ( 95) 1,140 ( 31 ) 1,411 ( 7 ) 
1990 2,166 (2 4 ) 1,585 (104 ) 1,199 ( 36 ) 704 (3 ) 
1991 3,318 (17) 1,672 (9 1 ) 1,464 ( 3 9 ) 663 ( 5) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
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Table A.5 CROA profitability group net local margins o f 
sample firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 333 (17 ) 98 (11 9) -120 (70) -2 78 (1 3 ) 
1986 400 ( 3 8) 157 (125) - 74 ( 3 7) -412 (2) 
1987 475 ( 6 7 ) 202 (11 5) -92 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 491 (6 3 ) 191 (1 08) -54 ( 9) a ( 1 ) 
1989 537 ( 4 0) 162 (95) -128 (31 ) -5 51 ( 7) 
1990 530 (24 ) 1 94 (1 04 ) -94 ( 3 6) -212 ( 3) 
1991 661 (17 ) 164 ( 91) -108 ( 3 9) -263 ( 5 ) 
a) Omitted t o prevent disclosure . 
Table A. 6 CROA profitability group interest expense means 
sample firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Gr o up II Group III Group IV 
1985 125 ( 1 7) 100 ( 11 9) 135 ( 70) 110 (13) 
1986 121 ( 3 8) 67 (12 3) 100 ( 3 6) 197 ( 2) 
1987 83 (67) 46 ( 109 ) 116 ( 5) 0 ( 0) 
1988 105 (62) 68 ( 104 ) 91 ( 9) a ( 1) 
1989 113 ( 3 9) 98 (91 ) 121 (3 0) 226 ( 7) 
1990 121 (23) 1 03 ( 101 ) 134 ( 3 6) 72 ( 3) 
1991 205 (16) 86 (86) 131 (3 9) 76 ( 5) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
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Table A.7 CROA profitability group depreciation expense 
means of sample firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 175 (17 ) 156 ( 119 ) 153 (70 ) 84 (13 ) 
1986 206 ( 3 8 ) 156 ( 125 ) 128 ( 3 7 ) 144 ( 2 ) 
1987 208 ( 67) 147 (115) 212 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 206 (63 ) 170 ( 10 8 ) 134 ( 9 ) a ( 1 ) 
1989 222 ( 4 0 ) 180 (95 ) 169 ( 31 ) 222 ( 7 ) 
1990 257 (2 4 ) 205 (104 ) 160 ( 3 6 ) 101 ( 3 ) 
1991 419 (17 ) 208 (91 ) 197 ( 3 9 ) 101 ( 5) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table A.8 CROA profitability group local equity means of 
sample firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 2,071 (17) 1,477 (119 ) 956 (70) 494 (13) 
1986 1,775 (38) 1,408 (125) 839 (3 7 ) 506 (2 ) 
1987 1,908 ( 67) 1,514 (115 ) 844 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 2,230 (63) 1,689 (108 ) 750 ( 9) a ( 1 ) 
1989 2,673 (40 ) 1,894 (95) 1,228 ( 31 ) 1,275 ( 7 ) 
1990 3,003 ( 24) 2,174 (104) 1,165 ( 3 6) 755 ( 3 ) 
1991 4,199 ( 1 7) 2,276 ( 91 ) 1,401 ( 3 9) 569 ( 5 ) 
a) Omit ted to prevent disclosure. 
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Table A.9 CROA profitability group debt-asset ratio means 
of sample firms (in percentages) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 54.29 ( 1 7 ) 42.64 (119) 54.57 (70) 62.24 (13) 
1986 56.90 ( 3 8) 37.68 ( 125) 50 . 08 ( 3 7) 83 . 51 ( 2) 
1987 50.91 (67) 32 . 48 (1 15) 62.17 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 51.23 (63) 36 . 68 (108 ) 59.10 ( 9) a ( 1 ) 
1989 50 . 22 ( 4 0) 37 . 70 (95) 51.64 ( 31 ) 67.33 ( 7) 
199 0 50 . 68 ( 24 ) 38.35 (104 ) 57 .4 6 ( 3 6) 47.84 ( 3) 
1991 55 . 04 (17 ) 4 0 .18 ( 91) 58 . 92 ( 3 9) 56.02 ( 5) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table A . 10 CROA profitability group CROA means of sample 
firms (in percentages) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 16.99 (17) 13 . 03 (119) 7.03 (70) -6 . 68 (13) 
1986 19.54 (38 ) 15 . 50 ( 12 5) 6.73 (3 7) -3.77 ( 2 ) 
1987 20.57 ( 67 ) 16.42 ( 115) 9.76 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0) 
1988 17.92 (63) 14.66 (108 ) 7 . 34 ( 9) a ( 1 ) 
1989 16.53 ( 4 0) 12.66 (95) 5 . 06 ( 31) -2.60 ( 7) 
1990 14 . 61 (24 ) 13.07 (10 4 ) 5 . 35 (3 6) -3.89 ( 3) 
1991 13.13 (17 ) 11.44 (91) 4.99 ( 3 9) -6.01 ( 5) 
a) Omitted t o prevent disclosure. 
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Table A.11 CROA profitability group ROE means of sample 
firms (in percentages ) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 21.28 (17 ) 6.71 (119 ) - 14.57 (70 ) -54.88 (13 ) 
1986 27.15 ( 38 ) 1 0 .26 (125 ) -9 . 35 ( 3 7 ) -138.93 (2 ) 
1987 27 . 72 ( 67 ) 11.82 (115 ) -28.64 ( 5 ) 0 ( 0 ) 
1988 22.95 (63 ) 10.24 (108 ) - 8.19 ( 9 ) a ( 1 ) 
1989 19 . 93 ( 4 0) 8.03 (95 ) -12.27 ( 31 ) -35.17 ( 7 ) 
1990 18 . 12 (24 ) 8 . 10 (104 ) -15.16 ( 3 6 ) -25.3 0 ( 3 ) 
1991 16.18 (17 ) 7.10 (91 ) -11.64 ( 3 9 ) -40 . 84 ( 5 ) 
a ) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
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APPENDIX B: FOCUS FIRM ROA PROFITABILITY GROUP PROFILES 
Table B .l ROA profitability group sales means of focus 
firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 14,126 ( 4 6) 8,786 (57 ) 9,848 (20) 8,610 ( 27 ) 
1986 9,911 (103) 7 , 345 (2 4) 7 , 739 (14 ) 7,751 ( 8 ) 
1987 9,859 ( 13 5 ) 5,983 (10 ) a ( 1 ) 8,661 ( 3 ) 
1988 13 , 042 (133 ) 8,285 ( 11 } 11,236 ( 5 } 3, 562 ( 2 } 
1989 16 , 559 (97) 12,168 (23 ) 11,256 ( 7} 12 ,878 (23) 
1990 17,096 ( 85 ) 13,182 (36 ) 15,635 (17) 7,483 (14) 
1991 16,971 ( 80 } 15,991 (28 ) 17,801 (17) 8,822 (27) 
a) Omitted t o prevent disclosure. 
Table B.2 ROA profitability group term debt means of focus 
firms in thousands of dollars ( firms reporting 
debt } 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 503 ( 3 9) 554 (56 ) 755 (19 ) 45 6 ( 2 6 } 
1986 433 (90) 403 (22 ) 537 (13) 3 09 ( 7 ) 
1987 386 (107 ) 258 (7 ) a ( 1} 363 ( 3} 
1988 370 (105 ) 318 ( 6) 593 (5) a ( 1 ) 
1989 359 ( 65} 261 (18 ) 447 (7) 47 9 (19 ) 
1990 332 (56 ) 382 ( 2 9 } 534 ( 1 7 ) 78 0 ( 7) 
1991 319 (52) 621 (24) 885 (16) 389 (20) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure . 
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Table B.3 ROA profitability group local asset means of 
focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 4,081 ( 4 6) 2,614 ( 5 7) 2,670 (20) 2,437 ( 27) 
1986 3 , 150 (103) 2,318 (24) 2,311 (14) 2,103 ( 8) 
1987 3,378 (1 35 ) 1,767 (10) a ( 1) 2,618 ( 3) 
1988 4,242 (133 ) 2,411 ( 11) 3,351 ( 5) 9,701 { 2) 
1989 4,536 (9 7 ) 3,032 (23) 2,926 { 7) 3,687 (23) 
1990 5,030 (85) 3,868 ( 3 6) 4,551 (17) 2,459 (14) 
1991 5,415 (80) 5,139 ( 2 8) 5,488 (1 7 ) 3,256 { 27) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table B . 4 ROA profitability group fixed asset means of 
focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 1,480 { 4 6) 1,335 ( 57) 1,404 { 2 0) 1,173 (27) 
1986 1,478 (103) 1,301 (24) 1,016 (14) 864 { 8) 
1987 1,500 ( 13 5) 702 (10) a ( 1) 3 ,605 ( 3) 
1988 1,549 (133) 961 (11) 1,011 ( 5) 285 ( 2) 
1989 1 , 659 (97) 1,337 (23) 1 , 399 ( 7) 1,235 (23) 
1990 1,792 (85) 1,616 ( 36) 1,506 (17) 880 (14 ) 
1991 1,905 (8 0) 2,005 (28) 1,834 (17) 1,082 { 27) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure . 
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Table B.5 ROA profitability group net local margins of 
focus firms in thousands o f dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 256 ( 4 6) 57 ( 57) -72 ( 2 0) -253 ( 27) 
1986 278 (10 3 ) 68 (24 ) - 48 (14 ) -185 ( 8) 
1987 363 ( 135 ) 46 (10) a ( 1 ) -129 ( 3) 
1988 352 (133 ) 48 ( 11 ) -55 ( 5 ) -32 (2 ) 
1989 340 (9 7 ) 77 (23 ) -82 ( 7 ) -2 75 (23 ) 
1990 339 (8 5 ) 80 (36 ) -79 (17 ) - 125 (14 ) 
1991 305 ( 8 0) 63 ( 28) -88 (1 7) -15 0 (27 ) 
a ) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table B.6 ROA profitability group interest expense means 
of focus firms in thousands o f dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 116 (46 ) 114 ( 57) 150 (20) 151 ( 2 7) 
1986 82 (101) 84 (24) 138 (14) 113 ( 7) 
1987 64 (129 ) 53 (10) a ( 1) 92 ( 3) 
1988 87 (129) 70 (11) 133 (5) 28 ( 2) 
1989 102 (92) 120 (23 ) 164 ( 7) 147 (23) 
1990 99 ( 81) 130 ( 3 6) 192 (17) 75 (1 4 ) 
1991 85 (74) 157 ( 28) 189 (17) 84 ( 2 7) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
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Table B.7 ROA profitability group depreciation expense 
means of f ocus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 203 ( 4 6) 166 ( 57 ) 171 ( 2 0 ) 172 (27 ) 
1986 188 (103 ) 170 (24 ) 148 (14 ) 168 ( 8 ) 
1987 192 ( 135 ) 132 ( 10 ) a ( 1 ) 246 ( 3 ) 
1988 200 (133 ) 157 (11 ) 190 ( 5 ) 50 ( 2 ) 
1989 211 (97 ) 170 (23 ) 198 ( 7 ) 193 (23 ) 
1990 229 (85 ) 201 ( 3 6 ) 217 (17 ) 1 0 6 (14 ) 
1991 242 (80 ) 241 ( 2 8) 233 (17 ) 1 57 ( 2 7 ) 
a ) Omitted t o prevent disclosure. 
Table B.8 ROA profitability group local equity means of 
focus firms in thousands of dollars 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 2,126 ( 4 6) 1,496 ( 57 ) 1,105 ( 20 ) 965 ( 27 ) 
1986 1,769 (103 ) 1,468 ( 24 ) 938 (14 ) 971 ( 8 ) 
1987 1,876 ( 135 ) 1,022 (10 ) a ( 1 ) 1,338 ( 3 ) 
1988 2,064 (133 ) 1,351 (11) 932 ( 5 ) 524 ( 2 ) 
1989 2,344 (97) 1,710 (23) 1,402 ( 7) 1,250 (23) 
1990 2,550 (85) 1,959 ( 3 6 ) 1 ,4 58 (17 ) 843 (14 ) 
1991 2,689 ( 80) 2,263 ( 28) 1,603 (17 ) 1,119 ( 27 ) 
a) Omi tted to prevent disclosure. 
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Table B.9 ROA profitability group debt-asset ratio means 
of focus firms (in percentages ) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group I V 
1985 44.38 ( 46 ) 44.29 ( 5 7) 52.03 ( 20) 58.61 ( 2 7 ) 
1986 42.55 (103) 37.28 (24 ) 57 . 60 (14) 44.36 ( 8) 
1987 39.61 (135 ) 39.28 (10 ) a ( 1) 40.86 ( 3) 
1988 42.37 (133) 38 . 77 ( 11 ) 71. 54 ( 5) 41.34 ( 2 ) 
1989 41.40 (97 ) 42.54 (23 ) 56.12 ( 7) 54.26 (23 ) 
1990 39.79 (8 5 ) 43.84 ( 3 6 ) 62.69 ( 1 7) 50.53 (14 ) 
1991 41 . 20 (80 ) 46.29 ( 2 8 ) 68 . 62 (17) 52.15 ( 27 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
Table B.10 ROA profitability group ROA means of focus 
firms (in percentages) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 9.99 ( 4 6) 6.15 ( 57) 2.59 (20) -3.44 ( 27 ) 
1986 11.71 (103 ) 6.08 (24 ) 3.01 (14) -3.32 ( 8 ) 
1987 12.87 (135 ) 4.92 (10 ) a ( 1 ) -2.36 (3) 
1988 11 . 32 (133 ) 4.73 (11) 2.98 ( 5 ) -0.45 ( 2 ) 
1989 9.72 (97) 5.74 (23 ) 2.01 ( 7 ) -3 . 53 (23 ) 
1990 9.02 (85) 5.79 (36 ) 2.35 ( 1 7 ) -2 . 59 (14 ) 
1991 7.42 ( 8 0) 4.27 ( 2 8 ) 1. 80 (17 ) -3.16 (27 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure. 
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Table B.11 ROA profitabil ity gro up ROE means of focus 
firms {in percentages ) 
Year Group I Group II Group III Group IV 
1985 13.96 ( 4 6) 3 . 94 (57 ) -5 . 78 (20 ) -31. 07 { 27 ) 
1986 17.28 (103 ) 4.25 (24) -5 .79 (14 ) -15 .32 ( 8 ) 
1987 19.83 { 13 5 ) 3.88 (10) a ( 1 ) -9.24 ( 3 ) 
1988 16.97 (133 ) 3 .22 ( 11 ) -7.28 ( 5 ) -6 . 63 (2 ) 
1989 13.87 ( 97 ) 4.23 (2 3 ) -10.07 { 7) -2 0 . 54 ( 23 ) 
1990 12 . 57 { 85 ) 3.80 ( 3 6 ) -17 .88 (17 ) -15.22 (14 ) 
1991 10.57 ( 8 0) 2.69 ( 2 8) -8.13 (17) -19.25 ( 2 7 ) 
a) Omitted to prevent disclosure . 
